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‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment
by JOHN A. HUMBACH∗

Introduction
Two Florida teenagers took over one hundred photographs of
1
themselves naked and engaging in unspecified but lawful “sexual
2
behavior.” The two were subsequently charged with “promoting a
sexual performance of a child,” a second degree felony under Florida
law, for “producing, directing or promoting a photograph or
representation that they knew to include the sexual conduct of a
3
child.” For her role in photographing the lawful conduct, the 16year-old defendant A.H. was adjudged delinquent on a plea of nolo
4
5
contendere, and the judgment was upheld on appeal. In justifying
the felony delinquency judgment, the court observed, among other
things, that if the pictures ever got out, “future damage may be done

∗ Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.A., Miami University; J.D.,
Ohio State University.
1. B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 260 (Fla. 1995) (holding that the state constitutional
right of privacy prevented prosecution of sexual activities between minors and criticizing
the prosecution’s theory under which the law would have been utilized not “as a shield to
protect a minor, but rather, . . . as a weapon to adjudicate a minor delinquent”).
2. A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235–36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). At the time, the
defendant A.H. was sixteen years old and her boyfriend was seventeen. Id. Both were
charged as juveniles. Id. See also Declan McCullagh, Police Blotter: Teens Prosecuted for
Racy Photos, CNET NEWS, Feb. 9, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/Police-blotter-Teensprosecuted-for-racy-photos/2100-1030_3-6157857.html.
3. A.H., 949 So. at 235; FLA. STAT. § 827.071(3) (2007). “Sexual conduct” includes
various form of sexual intercourse or contact as well as “actual lewd exhibition of the
genitals.” FLA. STAT. § 827.071(1)(g) (2007).
4. A.H., 949 So. 2d at 236.
5. Id. at 239 (holding that, even assuming sexual intercourse between two minors is
legal, the state’s constitutional right of privacy did not protect the defendant’s act of
photographing her own sexual conduct). It should be noted that no First Amendment
issues were considered or, apparently, raised in the appeal.
[433]
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6

to these minors’ careers or personal lives.” The court did not
mention “the potential impact on their lives from a child pornography
7
conviction.”
In Ohio, a fifteen-year-old girl used her cell phone to send nude
photos of herself and was charged with “illegal use of a minor in
8
9
nudity-oriented material.” The charges were based on a statute that
the United States Supreme Court had previously considered and
10
upheld. Although the Supreme Court’s earlier decision indicated
that, to be constitutional, the statute would have to be limited to
pictures going beyond mere nudity (for example, “involving a lewd
11
exhibition or graphic focus on a minor’s genitals” ), the prosecutor
proceeded against the girl anyway. The girl agreed to enter a plea to
a lesser felony, apparently hoping to avoid the risk of conviction on
charges that could have led to a twenty year registration requirement
as a sex offender. However, the court refused to accept her plea and,
instead, put the case over for six months on the condition that the girl
comply with conditions set by the prosecutor. After she was caught
violating one of the prosecutor’s conditions (by using a cell phone),
12
she was sentenced.
In New Jersey, a fourteen-year-old girl was arrested on child
pornography charges after the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children reported her to the authorities for thirty or so

6. Id.
7. Nancy Rommelmann, Anatomy of a Child Pornographer, REASON, July 2009,
available at http://www.reason.com/news/show/133863.html.
8. Russ Zimmer, Student to Admit to 1 Charge in Cell-Phone Nudity Case, NEWARK
ADVOCATE (Ohio), Nov. 11. 2008; Kim Zetter, Teen Girl Faced Child Porn Charges for
E-Mailing Nude Pictures of Herself to Friends—Update, WIRED BLOG NETWORK, Oct. 22,
2008, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/teen-girl-faces/.
9. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (West 2008).
10. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 126 (1990) (concluding that the First Amendment
does not prevent the states from criminalizing the private possession of child
pornography). But cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding, by contrast,
that the First Amendment does prevent prohibitions on the private possession of
obscenity). See infra text accompanying notes 96–114.
11. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 107 and discussion infra note 113. Press reports of the case
give no indication that any of the pictures went beyond mere nudity but, then again, the
standard of “graphic focus” is not exactly self-explanatory and capable of varying
interpretations.
12. Russ Zimmer, Court: Teen Accused of Texting Nude Photos Violated Deal,
NEWARK ADVOCATE (Ohio), Apr. 21, 2009; I have found no report of what, exactly, the
girl’s ultimate sentence was.
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nude pictures of herself posted on her MySpace page. She was
charged with possessing and distributing child pornography. As a
condition of withdrawing the charges, the prosecutor required the girl
to undergo at least six months of counseling and probation and to
14
“stay out of trouble.”
Otherwise, if convicted, she would be
15
required, after serving her sentence, to register as a sex offender.
Factual situations like these are not isolated. A recent study
shows that about twenty percent of U.S. teenagers (including eleven
percent of teen girls ages thirteen to sixteen) admit to producing and
16
17
distributing nude or semi-nude pictures of themselves. Today’s

13. Jennifer H. Cunningham, 14-Year-Old Girl Faces Pornography Charge,
NORTHJERSEY.COM, Mar. 25, 2009, available at http://www.northjersey.com/passaic/14year-old_girl_faces_pornography_charge.html.
14. N.J. Teen Won’t Face Child Porn Charges for Posting Nude Photos of Self on
MySpace, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 23, 2009, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,528602,00.html.
15. Id.
16. While the Supreme Court has said that “depictions of nudity, without more,
constitute protected expression,” Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 765 (1982)), lower court decisions both before and since have held that, even
without nudity, photographs can constitute child pornography as “lascivious display of the
genitals.” See, e.g., United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 754 (3d Cir. 1994) (genital areas
covered); United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d sub nom.
United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987). For a discussion of these latter
cases and of what “more” is required to make nudity lose its constitutional protection, see
Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 946–61 (2001).
There do not seem to be studies showing the proportion of sexually explicit self-produced
teen photographs that are actually illegal, as opposed to depicting only “nudity, without
more,” and it easy to see why. It is a serious crime to possess or view even a single image
that goes over the line. See infra notes 71–72. No researchers in their right minds would
want to incur the long prison terms that empirical studies could bring. As a practical
matter, therefore, state and federal laws effectively prohibit independent scientific
research into the various empirical questions that arise in this area. In any case, given the
haziness of the line between legal and illegal images (with even non-nude photos being
potentially illegal), it may be virtually impossible to do a reliable count. With prosecutions
already occurring, however, it seems a fair presumption that any pictures showing teen
nudity will result in a substantial legal risk for the teens who take and possess them even if
the pictures might, after a trial and possible appeals, turn out to be constitutionally
protected as merely nudity “without more.”
17. See NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY,
SEX AND TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 1 (2008),
available at http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech_Summary.pdf.
With their ubiquitous cell phones, it must be extremely easy for teens to just step in front
of a mirror, pop the shot, and send it. In addition to pictures made and distributed using
cell phones, an estimated 5% of the child pornography images found on the Internet,
amounting to “hundreds of thousands of images,” are self-produced, according to statistics
quoted by Professor Leary. See Mary Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography: The
Appropriate Societal Response to Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
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young people no doubt want to be popular and interesting to their
contemporaries as much as any prior generation. But the youth of
today do not stay in touch with pens and scented paper. They text.
They do not send each other little portraits in lockets. They snap
photos on their cell phones. And, for better or worse, they do not
regard sexuality as the monopoly of older generations but as a part of
18
their lives. Even if they personally abstain, they know that they are
literally surrounded by classmates and friends who do not, and (as
compared with recent generations) sexual encounters within their
peer group are already a familiar and normal aspect of life.
Along with the burgeoning phenomenon of teenagers’ taking
sexually explicit pictures of themselves and sending them to friends
by cell phone and other digital gadgets, a new word, “sexting,” has
been invented. There are reports of sexting prosecutions against
19
teens across the country. As the teenagers learned in the cases
described above, taking sexually explicit pictures of persons under the

L. 1, 19 (2007). Professor Leary also cites a New Zealand study that found “the largest
group of child pornography offenders to be between the ages of fifteen and nineteen years
old.” Id. at 20.
A more recent Pew survey shows somewhat lower numbers. Amanda Lenhart, Pew
Internet and American Life Project, TEENS AND SEXTING (2009), available at
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Teens_and_Sexting.pdf. The Pew
survey was, however, conducted by telephone and so the respondents (who were
apparently not anonymous) may have been reluctant to confess a potential felony to
stranger on the line. The Pew survey itself concedes that its study may “underreport the
actual incidence” inasmuch as sexting is subject to a “relatively high level of social
disapproval.” Id at 4, n.10.
For a discussion of sexting in its socio-political context, see David Rosen, Sexting: The
Latest Innovation in Porn, COUNTERPUNCH, Mar. 25, 2009, available at
http://www.counterpunch.org/rosen03252009.html. For an illuminating mix of teen
comments on the National Campaign’s study, see Sex and Tech, COSMO GIRL BLOG, Dec.
10, 2008, available at http://www.cosmogirl.com/blog/sex-and-tech (linked from the
National Campaign website).
18. Roughly half of U.S. high school students have had sexual relations, with the
percentage slightly higher for boys than for girls. See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, U.S.
TEEN SEXUAL ACTIVITY 1 (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/youthhivstds/upload/US-Teen-Sexual-Activity-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
19. Reportedly, child pornography prosecutions against sexting teens have been
commenced in at least ten states. Texting Trouble; Trouble While Texting, ABC NEWS
TRANSCRIPT, Mar. 13, 2009. See Rommelmann, supra note 7; Kim Zetter, Child Porn
Laws Used Against Kids Who Photograph Themselves, WIRED BLOG NETWORK, Jan. 15,
2009, available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/kids/; Naked Photos, E-Mail
Get Teens in Trouble, FOXNEWS.COM, June 5, 2008, available at http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,363438,00.html.
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age of eighteen, even of oneself, are state and federal felonies.
Under federal law, moreover, any person who “produces” sexually
explicit images, including “lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area,” is required to maintain certain detailed records and to
21
keep his or her home available for FBI inspections.
Failure to
22
comply is also a felony. Since it is unlikely that very many teens are
keeping the required records, this law alone means that millions of
American teenagers are felony sex offenders.
In addition to the prohibitions on producing child pornography,
it is a felony under both federal and state laws to possess or distribute
images showing, among other things, “lascivious exhibition of the
23
genitals or pubic area” of persons under the age of eighteen. Thus,
in addition to the twenty percent of teens who are “producing”
sexually explicit images of themselves, there is, perhaps an even
greater number of teens who are guilty of felonies for having received
such images and retained or forwarded them to others (i.e.,
24
“possession” and “distribution”). Receiving just one picture carries
25
a mandatory minimum sentence of five years. On the conservative
assumption that, for each teen who photographs herself, an average
of two or three classmates receive copies of the pictures, it is a
plausible estimate that as many as forty to fifty percent or more of
otherwise law-abiding American teenagers are already felony sex
offenders under current law and as such are subject to long-term
imprisonment followed by “sex offender” registration requirements
26
for decades or for life.

20. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2008). For a discussion of the applicability of state
child pornography laws to minors, see Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child
Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505, 512–15
(2008), pointing out that these laws do not exempt minors.
21. 18 U.S.C § 2257 (2006); see Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 325
(6th Cir. 2009). The law and its registration requirements also apply to persons who take
explicit pictures of persons over eighteen. Id. So sexting teens, who are legally adults, can
also be felony sex offenders under this statute.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2258 (2006).
23. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 & 2252A (2008); Smith, supra note 20.
24. Thirty-one percent of teens ages thirteen to nineteen say they have received a
sender’s nude or semi-nude picture or video of someone, and twenty-nine percent say they
have had such a picture or video “shared” with them (though not meant for them).
NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, supra note
17, at 11.
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), (b)(1) (2008).
26. A sex offender label, Illinois State’s Attorney James Glasgow recently explained,
“means your economic viability is zero for the rest of your life.” Elizabeth Martin,
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Whatever else one may make of all this, there is certainly reason
to suspect something is profoundly amiss when a system of laws
makes serious felony offenders of such a large proportion of its young
people. The fact that most of them will probably never be prosecuted
is a hardly redeeming point. What kind of justice system turns a blind
eye to millions of violators while selectively prosecuting a few? If the
laws are sound as written, how can the authorities justify a systematic
failure to uncover and prosecute the legions of young felons in our
midst? If on the other hand the laws are not sound, how can they be
left on the books, a kind of Sword of Damocles for youth, nominally
making serious crimes out of conduct that may be deemed, de facto,
too harmless to pursue? Arguably, at least, a self-respecting legal
system should either enforce its laws or admit they are wrong and fix
27
them.
This Article considers whether people, particularly teenagers,
have a constitutional right to record and document their own legal
activities, in particular, sexual conduct and nudity.
Such
“autopornography” may sometimes be considered legally obscene, a
28
category that is not, of course, protected by the First Amendment.
But even pictures and videos that are not obscene may still be illegal
if they fall into the broad constitutional category of “child
29
pornography.”
However, the constitutional questions are more
complicated than simply placing pictures and videos in the correct
legal category.

Sexting, SOUTHTOWN STAR, Sept. 26, 2009, available at http://www.southtownstar.com/
lifestyles/1790868,092709sexting.article. The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006, which includes the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act,
effectively makes it mandatory for states to impose registration requirements on anyone
fourteen years or older who is convicted of a child pornography offense. See 42 U.S.C. §
16911 (2006) (defining “sex offenders” required to register) and 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006)
(penalties for failure to register). See Britney M. Bowater, Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006: Is There a Better Way to Tailor the Sentences of Juvenile Sex
Offenders? 57 CATH. U.L. REV. 817 (2008).
Some observers see the prosecution of sexting teenagers as a good thing. See, e.g., Leary,
supra note 17. Others disagree. See Smith, supra note 20 (advocating handling by child
protective services). For the view that it is not good policy to force sexting teens to
register as sex offenders and to force them out of their homes under the often
accompanying residency restrictions, see Smith, supra note 20, at 535–40.
27. Compare Amy Adler, All Porn All the Time¸ 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
695 (2007), in which Professor Adler provides an eloquent review of embarrassments in
the efforts to rein in obscenity even before emergence of the current “sexting”
phenomenon.
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Part III.
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Obscenity is a fraught concept whose legal definition depends
significantly on the “value” of the content being expressed. It
remains to be seen whether definitions devised decades ago, for a
different technological context and under different social
circumstances, can sustain a blanket constitutional exclusion for
30
expressive content that now may have far more than “slight value”
to large numbers of people. Child pornography presents a different
class of questions: The broad categorical exclusion established for
child pornography in 1982 seems, in its verbal formulation at least, to
easily include teen sexting and other autopornography. That
categorical exclusion was, however, motivated by a pressing need to
address a particular set of serious harms: Adults’ sexual exploitation
and abuse of children used in the production of sexually explicit
31
materials. It is a serious question, therefore, whether the categorical
exclusion should be understood to include materials produced under
entirely different circumstances, where the originally motivating
harms are absent and the brunt of the suppression can savage the
lives and future prospects of the very people whom the laws are
supposed to protect.

I.

Autopornography as Obscenity

For nearly 170 years, the Supreme Court never considered the
question of whether there is an implicit obscenity exception to the
protections for speech and press guaranteed by the First
32
33
Amendment. Then, in Roth v. United States, the Court discovered
30. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)). See generally infra Part II.
31. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982); see generally infra Part III.C.
32. “[T]his is the first time the question has been squarely presented to this Court,
either under the First Amendment or under the Fourteenth Amendment . . .” Roth, 354
U.S. at 481. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Court stated in
passing that “lewd and obscene” utterances (along with “the profane, the libelous and the
insulting or ‘fighting words’”) are “no essential part of any exposition of ideas,” and that
their prohibition has “never been thought to raise any constitutional problem.” Id. at 572
(upholding a conviction for uttering “fighting words”). It is not completely clear, however,
what content the Chaplinsky court was attributing to the word “obscene,” since (as the
Court has since admitted) the actual meaning of the word has proved to be a bit elusive.
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 19, n.2 (1973) and infra text accompanying notes 50–51.
This is not to say, however, that there was no considerable effort to suppress books, mostly
literature, in the lower courts, largely under the influence of an English case, Regina v.
Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360, 371, which condemned a religious tract as obscene citing its
supposed “tendency . . . to deprave and corrupt” the minds of the vulnerable.” See
Stephen Gillers, A Tendency To Deprave And Corrupt: The Transformation Of American
Obscenity Law From Hicklin To Ulysses II, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 215 (2007). Noting the
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that such an exception indeed exists. The Court held that obscenity
34
35
36
was, like blasphemy, profanity, and libel, a kind of expression that
37
was simply “outside the protection intended for speech and press.”
While the Court asserted that obscene utterances have only
“slight social value,” which is “clearly outweighed by the social
38
interest in order and morality,” this low value was not the rationale
39
for recognizing an obscenity exception. Indeed, the Court expressly
dismissed the notion that the obscenity exception needed to be
40
justified. The stated legal basis for the obscenity exception was flatly
historical: “The rejection of obscenity,” wrote the Court, “is implicit
41
in the history of the First Amendment.” At no point, moreover, did
the Court make the least suggestion that it was creating the obscenity
exception right then and there, in 1957. On the contrary, the Roth
opinion clearly took the view that the scope of First Amendment

many decades of self-censorship that Hicklin test had induced, Professor Gillers remarked
that “[n]o judicial pronouncement from an American or British court in the last 140 years
has been as harmful to creative artists as Cockburn’s single sentence.” Id. at 221.
33. Roth, 354 U.S. 476.
34. But cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–09 (1968) (quoting Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1872)) (“The law knows no heresy.”).
35. But cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (striking a conviction for uttering
“Fuck the Draft”). Cf. also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744–48 (1978)
(distinguishing broadcast speech from speech elsewhere).
36. But cf. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (severely curtailing suits for
defamation in cases of public figures).
37. Roth, 354 U.S. at 483 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). “[T]here is
sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was outside the
protection intended for speech and press.” Id. (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)).
The Court has also asserted the existence of competing state interests in later cases, as
well. E.g., in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 19 (1973) (“This Court has recognized that
the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene
material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending
the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.”) (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted).
39. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (“The protection given speech and press was fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.”).
40. Id. at 484–87 (citing dicta from Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952)
(“Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech . . . may be punished only upon a
showing of such circumstances,” for example “a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil.”).
41. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (emphasis added).
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protection and, hence, the scope of the exception for obscenity, “was
42
43
fashioned” at the time of the Bill of Rights.
Thus, relying on history, the Court in Roth placed a serious
44
constitutional cloud over not only teen sexting and autopornography
but over a branch of the publishing industry that is now worth billions
45
of dollars per year, denying to both the full force of the free press
guaranty. It is as though somebody suddenly realized that, as a
matter of history, the Framers had never intended to protect
motorcycle magazines and so, from then on, the First Amendment’s
protection ceased to apply to motorcycling content.
The historical evidence for an early obscenity exception is,
however, quite a bit more sketchy than the Roth Court seemed to
46
assume when it “squarely held” that “obscenity is not within the

42. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
43. The Court continued to insist on this “originalist” source of the obscenity
exception 25 year later when it again asserted that “‘rejection of obscenity . . . was implicit
in the history of the First Amendment.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754 (1982)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added) (without, however, citing any historical authority
from the time of First Amendment’s ratification). And the Court reconfirmed this view
that original intent is the basis of the obscenity exception just last year in District of
Columbia v. Heller. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (“The
First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified,
which included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets.”).
One consequence of this purely historical foundation for the obscenity exception is
legislative bodies have the power to enact laws restricting obscenity “on the basis of
unprovable assumptions.” Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 120 (1973) (citing Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60–63 (1973)).
44. Which was then, of course, still in the future.
45. One fairly recent industry source placed U.S. pornography revenues in 2006 at
about $12.45 billion per year for “adult entertainment.” FREE SPEECH COALITION,
STATE-OF-THE-INDUSTRY REPORT 2007-08 1 (2008). Another source, apparently an
industry critic, put the 2006 figure at $13.33 billion. FAMILY SAFE MEDIA, http://www.
familysafemedia.com/pornography_statistics.html. The total for sixteen industrialized
countries was given as $97 billion in 2006. Jerry Ropelato, Internet Pornography Statistics,
available at http://internet-filter-review.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.
html#anchor2. These figures represent, of course, not the value of the industry to those
who run it (whose net profits are much lower) but to the consumers who buy it.
The industry’s annual revenues would probably be even greater were it not for the
damping effect of the obscenity laws on copyright enforcement. “Many adult businesses
have been hesitant to . . . pursue prosecution of those pirating their materials . . .
concerned that prosecuting for piracy will bring about unwanted government attention.”
FREE SPEECH COALITION, supra, at 13. An “estimated . . . 50% of online materials
consists of pirated content.” Id. By muting the effectiveness of copyright monopolies, the
nation’s obscenity laws apparently do much to assure the abundant supply of inexpensive
pornography on the Internet.
46. United States v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754 (citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 485).
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47

area of constitutionally protected speech or press.” Justice Douglas
(who presumably had clerks to look into the matter) could not find
48
any such evidence, nor apparently has anyone else. The Court cited
a few state cases and statutes in support of its historical claim, but
these are poor evidence of the thinking at the time that the First
Amendment was drafted. After all, until well into the twentieth
century, nobody even thought the amendment had anything to do
49
with the states. And then there is the awkward fact that neither the
Roth definition of obscenity nor today’s definition “reflect the precise
50
meaning of ‘obscene’ as traditionally used in the English language.”

47. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
48. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 70. See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 40
(1973); Roth, 354 U.S. at 514; United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413
U.S. 123, 130–37 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
49. Compare Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (Bill of Rights does not apply
against the states) with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech and
press, as fundamental liberties, are protected from state impairment by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
Another reason why early cases and statutory prohibitions, even federal, shed little light
on the original understanding of the First Amendment’s scope is that, during the first
century or more following the adoption of the Bill of Rights, it was thought that the Free
Speech Clause only prohibited prior restraints, and prosecutions after the fact were
generally permissible. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (“[T]he main
purpose of [the First Amendment] is ‘to prevent . . . previous restraints upon publications . . .’
and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to
the public welfare.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 313–14 (1825)).
50. Miller,, 413 U.S. at 19 n. 2. As used in ordinary English, the Court explains, the
term “obscene” has a meaning that generally encompasses whatever is disgusting,
revolting, offensive, or the like. Id. The Court could not, however, embrace this meaning
without also embracing as “implicit in the history of the First Amendment” a denial of
protection to all disgusting, revolting and offensive speech. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. Such a
reading would, of course, limit the First Amendment to inoffensive speech, making it just
about nugatory.
Recognizing its earlier misapprehension of the word “obscenity,” the Court observed in
Miller that the material discussed in Roth was “more accurately” defined as
“pornography.” Miller, 413 U.S. at 19 n.2. However, the Court did not adopt this term in
place of “obscenity,” probably because, if it did, it would risk disconnecting modern
obscenity doctrine from its supposed historical foundation. The Court’s way out of this
conundrum was to assert that “[p]ornographic material which is [legally] obscene forms a
sub-group of all ‘obscene’ expression,” namely, “obscene material ‘which deals with sex.’” Id.
But mysteries remain. The Court did not explain why, given the historical pretensions of
Roth, some but not all historically “obscene” material should be denied First Amendment
protection, or why the only kind of obscenity that should be denied protection is the kind
that “deals with sex.” The implicit reason for the distinction is that material that “deals
with sex” is of such “slight value” that little or nothing is lost by banning it when it is
offensive, whereas offensive materials dealing with other subjects may be worthy of
protection despite being offensive. Of course, the empirical fact and/or value judgment
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So even if we had evidence that the Framers meant to deny
protection to something they called “obscenity,” that evidence would
not mean they intended to exclude what we call obscenity under the
51
“specific judicial meaning” that the courts use today. The contours
of a legal rule cannot both have a deep historical origin and, at the
same time, be newly minted.
Thus we see that the constitutional status of a widespread form
of teen communication is thrown into doubt by a historical reading
that may be more inventive than accurate. As a practical matter,
however, the Court since Roth has treated early Americans’
understanding of the obscenity concept as being, in the words of
52
53
Justice Scalia “entirely irrelevant.” And this is probably just as
well, for even if one’s “originalist” commitments are strong, it may
fairly be questioned whether, as a historical matter, the Framers
actually gave much thought at all to excluding obscenity, especially
pictorial materials, from the First Amendment’s protection. The First
Amendment was after all drafted and ratified decades before the
invention of photography, in an era when the only pictographic
obscenity would have been paintings, engravings, drawings, and
statuary. Works of this sort are very labor-intensive and, therefore,
expensive to produce and relatively rare—never a big part of the
overall communications mix. Digital photography has changed
everything. If, therefore, the true foundation of the obscenity
exception is, indeed, in history, then the whole basis for the exception
is open to question. Perhaps for this very reason, combined with
realities set in motion by technology, today’s complex obscenity
doctrine will one day be looked back on as a late twentieth century
detour, just another one of those constitutional mistakes, like
54
55
56
Lochner, Chrestensen and Bowers v. Hardwick.

that this distinction presupposes is that material “dealing with sex” has ipso facto slight
value.
51. Miller, 413 U.S. at 19 n.2.
52. In another but analogous context.
53. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992); cf. David A.
Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 33, 33–47 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey
R. Stone eds., 2002) (describing the large disconnect between original understandings and
modern free expression doctrine).
54. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (entrenching economic due process),
effectively abrogated by e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

6 - HUMBACH_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

444

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

2/16/2010 6:06 PM

[Vol. 37:3

In the meantime, however, it certainly is possible that at least
some sexting and other teen autopornography falls within the Court’s
current definition of obscenity and therefore falls outside the
protection of the First Amendment. It is hard, though, to be too
definitive about this because the definition of obscenity is so difficult
to apply. As is well known, the Supreme Court has had more than a
little trouble deciding what should count as obscene once it concluded
57
that “obscenity” is unprotected speech. Since the 1973 case of Miller
58
v. California, however, the Court has stabilized its definition of
obscenity. Under the Court’s current definition, expressive materials
are deemed obscene if “the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest, is patently offensive in light of community
standards, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
59
value.”
Taking these three definitional elements in order, it seems highly
likely that some substantial part of sexually explicit teen
communications would meet the Miller criteria. It is plausible, for
example, that teens who make and send sexually explicit images and
videos of themselves do so with the intention of titillating their
friends and classmates. If “appeal to the prurient interest” means
60
anything, it means something like that. The Roth case specified that
55. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (excluding “commercial speech”
from First Amendment protection), abrogated by Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
56. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (citing traditional sexual values in
upholding a law that banned, among other things, sexual intercourse by same-sex couples),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). If the obscenity exception were
deprived of its historical rationale, the Court would presumably have to justify it in the
same way and the by the same standards as would apply to create or shape any other
categorical exclusion from the protection of speech and press. See infra Part III.G.
57. See United States v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754–55 (1982); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 20–23 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 78–114 (1973)
(Brennan, J. dissenting).
58. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
59. Id.
60. Actually, not everything that “turns on” other people is necessarily prurient.
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985). The distinction accepted by
the Court seems to be between, on one hand, material that excites only “normal, healthy
sexual desires” and, on the other hand, material that excites “sexual responses over and
beyond those that would be characterized as normal,” such as “a shameful or morbid
interest in nudity, sex, or excretion.” Id. The Court of Appeals in Brockett had elaborated
a bit further, seeming to say that material is not “prurient” for constitutional purposes if
“taken as a whole, [it] does no more than arouse ‘good, old fashioned, healthy’ interest in
sex,” citing the “healthy, wholesome, human reaction common to millions of well-adjusted
persons in our society.” Id at 499. But the question is what, in this day and age, cannot be
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the material must appeal to prurient interest of the “average
61
person,” but not long after Roth, the Supreme Court clarified this
point by saying that, when material does not actually appeal to the
62
average person’s prurience, then it does not have to. Under the
current rule, it is apparently enough that the materials can inspire the
63
requisite prurient thoughts in their intended audience. This last
qualification is fortunate, since it lets obscenity prosecutions sidestep
the sticky question of whether child pornography appeals to the
sexual interests of the “average” adult. To the extent that most
sexting and other teen autopornography are intended to inspire
classmates and friends, it would seem to readily meet the “prurient”
prong of the Miller definition. It is likewise easily conceived that such
pictures and videos would often meet the second Miller prong as well:
64
being “patently offensive in light of community standards.” In fact,
a significant portion of teen-produced material may even be
65
intentionally so.

counted as “good, old fashioned, healthy” sex but would, instead, be condemned as
“shameful or morbid?” Necrophilia comes to mind, but what else? Back in 1985, when
Brockett was decided, things might have been easier. Cf. Bowers, 478 U.S., overruled by
Lawrence, 539 U.S. But today’s climate is a good deal more tolerant (mercifully, in my
view). At any rate, the immediate question is whether teens’ depictions of teenage sexual
activity for a teenage audience are better understood as appealing to “normal, healthy
sexual desires” or as “shameful or morbid.” I think we can agree that casual teen sexual
relations probably did not fall within the 1986 heartland of “good, old fashioned, healthy”
sex. Predicting tomorrow’s judicial consensus is, however, another matter.
61. United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476, 489–90 (1957). See also Miller, 413 U.S. at
24–25, 33–34.
62. Sellers who catered to non-mainstream erotic tastes nearly escaped the obscenity
exception until the Court moved to fill this loophole, in 1966, by supplementing the
“average person” with the members of any “clearly defined deviant sexual group” likely to
receive the material in question. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966)
(emphasis added).
63. “We adjust the prurient-appeal requirement to social realities by permitting the
appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests of its intended
and probable recipient group.” Id. The Mishkin supplement apparently survived Miller’s
reworking of the obscenity definition. Miller, 413 U.S. at 33.
64. Of course, in state juvenile proceedings, the “lay jurors” that Miller assumed
would normally decide this issue will not ordinarily be present, so the determination of
“patently offensive in light of community standards” will be left to judges.
65. “Everybody knows somebody who either sent or has seen those kinds of
pictures,” said a 17-year-old female. “[B]oys . . . do it for the shock value or because they
think it’s funny, and girls are trying to . . . I don’t know, impress their boyfriends, like, ‘I’m
gonna reel you in with my bait.’” Bret Buckner, Teens Often Don’t Grasp the
Consequences of Sexting, LEDGER-ENQUIRER.COM, Oct. 11, 2009, available at
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/news/story/869865.html.
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As for third Miller prong, the lack of “serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value,” it must be remembered that we are
talking about creative works that are made by teens. To be sure,
teenagers may excel in some fields (e.g., gymnastics), but the arts,
literature, science and politics are not normally among them.
Accordingly, one may fairly doubt whether teens’ sexually explicit
creations are more likely than any other teen creations to possess the
high values deemed important and “serious” by the much older
individuals who would judge them.
Of course, teens’ communications may have a very high value to
the teenagers themselves, playing a crucial role in their everyday
lives, social interactions, quest for acceptance, personal self-discovery
and, in general, defining for themselves who they are and where they
fit in their world. But while a young person’s life is a thing of drama,
66
her elders may see only “sound and fury, signifying nothing.” If the
courts deprecate values that are of importance to large numbers of
young people, and characterize common kinds of teen communications as “no essential part of any exposition of ideas [and of] slight
67
social value as a step to truth,” then it should be easy enough for
prosecutors to satisfy this third Miller prong.
Nonetheless, in the years since Miller, prosecutions for obscenity
of all kinds have, for whatever reason, been occurring at a declining
68
rate. In the child pornography laws prosecutors seem to have found
a much more serviceable alternative. Unlike the Court’s obscenity
standards, child pornography laws involve no fuzzy facts like
“community standards” or “artistic value,” and prosecutors can make
a case with little more than proof that the defendant possessed or
69
made of a visual depiction of sexual conduct by a minor. So rather
than further belaboring the status of teen productions under
obscenity analysis, we turn now to consider its constitutional status as
child pornography.

II. Autopornography as Child Pornography
Even when teenage sexting and other autopornography is not
legally “obscene,” it still might be viewed as “child pornography” and,

66.
67.
68.
69.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
See Adler, supra note 27, at 700–05 (2007).
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (emphasis in original).
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70

therefore, unprotected by the First Amendment. This means that
Congress and state legislatures may impose penalties for producing,
71
distributing, possessing or even just viewing it. And the penalties
72
can be severe. So the crucial question is: to what extent can teenage
sexting and other autopornography be constitutionally treated as
“child pornography”?
A. The Creation of the Unprotected Category

The case that paved the way for prosecuting teens who make
73
sexually explicit pictures of themselves is New York v. Ferber. Prior
to Ferber, such pictures would have been protected by the First
74
Amendment unless constitutionally “obscene.”
However, the
Supreme Court in Ferber carved out a new First Amendment
exception that withdraws protection from “child pornography”
images and films whether they are obscene or not.
Ferber originated as a prosecution against a bookseller under a
statute that prohibited knowingly “promoting a sexual performance”
75
by an underage child.
The statute defined the term “sexual
76
performance” as a performance that includes any of several

70. Id. at 764–65 (upholding a ban on producing and distributing visual depictions of
sexual conduct by minors, whether or not obscene). The defendant in Ferber was
acquitted on the obscenity charges but nonetheless convicted of distributing child
pornography. Id. at 751–52.
71. Id.; Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); see generally infra Part III.A. Child
pornography prosecutions currently “account for about 2 percent of the entire federal
criminal caseload,” and is “one of the fastest-growing segments of the federal court
docket,” amounting to “more than 2,200 [new cases] in fiscal 2008.” Mark Hansen, A
Reluctant Rebellion, 95 A.B.A. 54, 56 (June 2009). For an excellent and informative
treatment of legal and constitutional questions surrounding child pornography, see Adler,
supra note 16.
72. A point stressed in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002), which
overturned a portion of a federal statute under which a “first offender may be imprisoned
for 15 years . . . . A repeat offender faces a prison sentence of not less than 5 years and not
more than 30 years in prison” Id. at 244. Currently, the maximum periods for the
surviving portions of the statute have been increased to 20 and 40 years, respectively. 18
U.S.C.A. § 2252A(b)(1) (2008). “The [sentencing] guidelines operate like a rocket ride
into the sentencing stratosphere.” Hansen, supra note 71, at 58.
73. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
74. Miller v. California, 413 U.S., 15 (1973). As noted supra, text accompanying note
70, not all child pornography is necessarily “obscene” under the Miller test.
75. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751. The present version of the statute is New York Penal Law
section 263.15.
76. A performance was defined as “any play, motion picture, photograph or dance”
or “any other visual representation exhibited before an audience.” N.Y. PENAL LAW §
263.00(4) (McKinney 2008) (present version).
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specified kinds of “sexual conduct” by the child, including
78
masturbation and “lewd exhibition of the genitals.” The defendant’s
specific conduct consisted of selling two films that showed young boys
79
masturbating.
The “single question” in Ferber was whether, “to prevent the
abuse of children who are made to engage in sexual conduct for
commercial purposes,” the state can constitutionally prohibit the
dissemination of material that shows children engaged in sexual
80
The
conduct “regardless of whether such material is obscene.”
Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, reasoning that
[w]hen a definable class of material . . . bears so heavily and
pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its production,
we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and
that it is permissible to consider these materials as without the
81
protection of the First Amendment.

The Court in Ferber made clear that it was not simply deciding
the facts of the case before it but, rather, carving out a whole new
category of expressive content that would from then on be denied
82
constitutional protection.
That the Ferber ruling was meant to
encompass not only the two particular films at issue but all of child

77. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW §263.00(1) (McKinney 2008)
(present version)).
78. Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(3) (McKinney 2008) (present version)).
79. Id. at 752. Both Ferber and the Supreme Court’s other landmark withdrawing
protection from child pornography, Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), involved
apparently gay-oriented pornography, a surprising disproportion considering the relative
representation of gays in the population as a whole. However, it is consistent with what
Professor Adler has described as the “[a]nti-homosexual fervor [that] also fueled the
movement.” For example, an expert testified before the House in 1977 that “most agree
that child sex and pornography is basically a boy-man phenomenon.” Amy Adler, The
Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 230 n. 116 (2001).
80. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753 (emphasis added). The defendant in Ferber was acquitted
of promoting an “obscene” sexual performance, but found guilty under the provisions
cited supra notes 75–78, which did not require proof that the material was obscene. Id. at 752.
81. Id. at 764.
82. The Court’s decision to carve out a new “category” of unprotected speech and
press apparently overlooked one of the two “cardinal principles of our constitutional
order,” namely, “never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” Id. at 767–68, 768 n. 20 (quoting United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960), which in turn was quoting Liverpool, N. Y. &
Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’ns of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)). See also Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1985); and infra Part III.G.
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pornography was confirmed in several places in the Ferber opinion.
The Court wrote, for example, of the “the category of child
84
pornography which . . . is unprotected by the First Amendment.” At
another point, it said that “[r]ecognizing and classifying child
pornography as a category of material outside the protection of the
85
First Amendment is not incompatible with our earlier decisions.”
The words “not incompatible” signal that the unprotected category is
a new one: No prior case had to be overruled, but the choice of words
also acknowledges that there was no precedent for the category.
In giving its holding in Ferber a broad, “categorical” reach, the
Court explained
it is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has
been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that
within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be
restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests,
if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is
86
required.
83. There is no real doubt that the Court in Ferber created a categorical exclusion, but
since our question now is whether sexting and autopornography are in the unprotected
category, it may pay to see what the Court said it was doing at the time.
The Court has since confirmed that Ferber was meant to withdraw constitutional
protection from a whole category of expression. United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct 1830,
1836 (2008); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46, 257 (2002) (“the
categories recognized in Ferber and Miller”). Accord United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622,
698 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Congress may regulate pornography involving all minors under the
age of eighteen if it has a rational basis for doing so.”); United States v. Freeman, 808 F.2d
1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Recognizing that states have compelling interests in protecting
children from sexual abuse, the Court held that visual depictions of sexual conduct of
children are not protected by the First Amendment.”).
Somewhat confusingly, the Court in Ferber sometimes chose wording that implied it was
narrowly deciding only the case before it, viz.: “[W]e hold that child pornography as
defined in [N.Y. Penal Law] § 263.15 is unprotected speech subject to content-based
regulation,” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766 n.18; “We hold that § 263.15 sufficiently describes a
category of material the production and distribution of which is not entitled to First
Amendment protection,” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765; and, “[T]here is nothing
unconstitutionally ‘underinclusive’ about a statute that singles out this category of material
for proscription.” Id. In the last two quotations, the Court uses the word “category” to
mean that which is defined in the New York statute and not a broad “category” of
constitutional dimensions. However, even if the Court meant to limit its holding the
particular facts and statute before it, the Ferber case has not been so interpreted in the
later cases that are cited this footnote.
84. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (emphasis added) (“There are, of course, limits on the
category of child pornography which, like obscenity, is unprotected by the First
Amendment.”).
85. Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 763–64 (emphasis added).
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Though a bit roundabout, this statement makes the conclusion
almost inescapable that the Court regarded child pornography as one
of those “not rare” categories of content for which the balance is so
overwhelming that “case-by-case adjudication” is unnecessary.
To be sure, before closing its opinion the Ferber Court conceded
87
that “case-by-case analysis” might continue to be needed after all, a
concession that seems at odds with the very concept of a “categorical”
exclusion. If the Court was correct in its earlier assertion that child
88
pornography requires “no process of case-by-case adjudication,”
why did it feel impelled to build in almost immediately a role for case89
by-case analysis? One is reminded of Justice Stevens’ remark: “Like
many bright line rules, the categorical rule established in this case is
90
only ‘categorical’ for a page or two in the U.S. Reports.”
Teens who find themselves prosecuted as child pornographers
may or may not ultimately receive constitutional protection under the
escape valve of “case-by-case analysis,” but even if they do the
categorical exclusion can still have potentially devastating impacts on
their lives: The reason is that the existence of the exclusion effectively
reverses the presumption of unconstitutionality that normally applies
91
to content-based regulations of speech.
What is more, the
categorical exclusion lets the courts bypass the exacting requirements
of strict scrutiny under which, ordinarily, the prosecution must prove
92
the constitutionality of the government’s action. As a result, the
categorical exclusion puts speakers of protected speech on the

87. Id. at 773–74.
88. Id. at 763–64, quoted more fully supra text accompanying note 86.
89. Id. at 773–74.
90. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1067 (1992) (Stevens, J. dissenting)
(“No sooner does the Court state [its new category] . . . than it quickly establishes an
exception.”).
91. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) (“When the
Government seeks to restrict speech based on its content, the usual presumption of
constitutionality afforded congressional enactments is reversed.”) (citing R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are presumptively
invalid.”)). Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434, 449 (2002)
(plurality opinion & Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing rule); Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986) (recognizing rule). See further discussion infra Part III.G.
92. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813, 816–17 (A “content-based speech restriction . . . can
stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny,” and “the Government bears the burden of proving
the constitutionality of its actions.”) (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989).
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defensive. Even when their speech is “protected,” teens who are
prosecuted for sexting or autopornography may be faced with a very
hard choice: either mount a case-by-case “as applied” challenge to a
94
prima facie valid law (and risk decades in jail) or plead guilty to a
95
lesser charge.
Eight years after Ferber created the new categorical exclusion for
child pornography, the Supreme Court extended the scope of the
exclusion to reach mere possession and viewing of the illicit materials.

93. The extent to which the government can constitutionally place the speakers of
protected speech on the defensive in the context of severe criminal penalties aimed at
speech itself is an open question. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002)
(“The Government raises serious constitutional difficulties by seeking to impose on the
defendant the burden of proving his speech is not unlawful.”). Placing the speaker on the
defensive seems, first of all, to run afoul of the principle that “[w]hen the Government
restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its
actions.” Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816. Moreover, this shift in the burden of persuasion can
be expected to have a particular chilling effect on protected speech where “[f]ailure to
establish the defense can lead to a felony conviction.” Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256. See also
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“The assumption that defense of a
criminal prosecution will generally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights is
unfounded” [because] “otherwise, the contours of regulation would have to be hammered
out case by case—and tested only by those hardy enough to risk criminal prosecution to
determine the proper scope of regulation.”). Cf. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119
(2003) (recognizing the “the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their
rights through case-by-case litigation”); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 118 (1971)
(absention case; Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he opportunity
to raise constitutional defenses at a criminal trial is inadequate to protect the underlying
constitutional rights.”). In short, from the standpoint of the defendant (and of free
speech), a process of case-by-base analysis is sharply inferior to the presumption of
unconstitutionality and strict scrutiny that would normally apply.
While one would not want to endorse the teenage practice of taking and sharing naked
pictures of themselves, the fact of the matter is that, if not obscene, the pictures may
constitute constitutionally protected expression, particularly if they show only nudity,
without more. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990) (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765, n.
18. In Ashcroft, the Court wrote that
this case provides a textbook example of why we permit facial challenges to
statutes that burden expression. With these severe penalties in force, few
legitimate movie producers or book publishers, or few other speakers in any
capacity, would risk distributing images in or near the uncertain reach of this law.
535 U.S. at 244. Teens may be more willful, daring and ready to defy convention than
movie producers and booksellers, but they are also even less in a position to defend
themselves from the catastrophic punitive consequences that are threatened in the childpornography laws. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 772 (“[T]he bookseller, with an economic
incentive to sell materials that may fall within the statute’s scope, may be less likely to be
deterred.”).
94. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
95. Which could still be a felony. See supra text accompanying notes 11–12.
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The case was Osborne v. Ohio. Although technically only dicta,
Osborne’s conclusion that states are allowed to punish the possession
and viewing of child pornography has since acquired the status of
98
law. This means that, absent some other limiting factor, the millions
99
of teenagers who receive and look at their friends’ autopornography
can be constitutionally treated as felony sex offenders and prosecuted
under the child pornography laws.
The central analytical point of the Osborne dicta was to
100
distinguish the earlier case of Stanley v. Georgia.
The Court in
Stanley had held that the states could not, on First Amendment
101
grounds, prohibit the mere private possession of obscene material.
What the Court said in Osborne was that the Stanley rule for
102
possession of obscenity did not extend also to child pornography.
In distinguishing Stanley, the Osborne dicta explained that the
103
reason for prohibiting the possession of child pornography was not
to control private thoughts (apparently the legislature’s aim in
104
Stanley) but “to protect the victims of child pornography . . . to
105
destroy a market for the exploitative use of children.” “Given the
importance of the State’s interest in protecting the victims of child
pornography,” the Court wrote, “we cannot fault Ohio for attempting
106
to stamp out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain.”
96. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
97. The Court held that the defendant’s conviction could not stand even if the
challenged statute were constitutional. Therefore, the Court did not need to resolve the
First Amendment question in order to decide the case. In reaching out to opine on a
constitutional point that the facts did not require it to decide, the Court therefore
rendered what amounted, in the circumstances, to an “advisory opinion” on that subject.
Cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484 (1987). Indeed,
the Court wrote, perhaps significantly, “we find [rather than we hold] that Ohio may
constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography.” Osborne, 495
U.S. at 111 (emphasis added).
98. United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct 1830, 1836 (2008)
99. According to the National Campaign, “25% of teen girls and 33% of teen boys
say they have had nude or semi-nude images—originally meant for someone else—shared
with them.” NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY,
supra note 17, at 3.
100. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
101. “[O]ur decision in Stanley was ‘firmly grounded in the First Amendment.’”
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986)).
102. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108–12.
103. Under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3).
104. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566).
105. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 110.
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The Court in Osborne also pointed out that enforcing penalties
for possession would encourage possessors to destroy their child
pornography, something that would advance two “other interests” of
the state, namely (a) preventing materials that “permanently record
the victim’s abuse” from causing “continuing harm by haunting the
107
children in years to come,” and (b) preventing pedophiles from
108
using the material “to seduce other children into sexual activity.”
(Never mind that such “destruction of evidence” to stave off
109
prosecution would now be a serious federal felony.) The Court has,
in any case, since questioned these two “other interests,” expressing
doubt that either would have been constitutionally compelling
110
enough on their own to justify a suppression of speech. Indeed, the
latter was explicitly declared feckless in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
111
Coalition.
Although the Court’s Osborne dicta talked of child pornography
112
as a class, it did not describe the Ferber “categorical” exclusion as
such, focusing instead on the problematically overbroad wording of
113
the Ohio statute at issue. Nevertheless, subsequent decisions leave

107. Id. at 111.
108. Id. “A child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult or to pose
for sexually explicit photos can sometimes be convinced by viewing other children having
‘fun’ participating in the activity.”
Id. n.7 (quoting 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 649 (1986)) (footnote omitted).
109. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(c)(1)(“20 years”). See also Alison Leigh Cowan, Lawyer
Admits Destroying Evidence of Pornography, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/nyregion/28lawyer.html. Even at the time of Osborne,
one might wonder to what degree the states have a legitimate interest in encouraging such
obstructions of justice. Congress also apparently thought that encouraging the destruction
of child pornography was a good idea before deciding to make it a serious crime. See 110
Stat. 3009–26, 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006) (findings).
110. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 157–225.
111. Id. at 251–54. Congress has also evidently found it rather feckless as well. In
enacting the PROTECT Act of 2003 (Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003), it wrote “the production of child
pornography is a byproduct of, and not the primary reason for, the sexual abuse of
children.” 117 Stat. 650, 678, 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006) (findings).
112. E.g., Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108 (“the interests underlying child pornography
prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley”). See
also id. at 109, 110, 111, 114 n. 9, 115.
113. “The Ohio statute, on its face, purports to prohibit the possession of ‘nude’
photographs of minors. We have stated that depictions of nudity, without more, constitute
protected expression.” Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112. However, the Court concluded, the
overbreadth problem was cured because the Ohio Supreme Court had limited the statute’s
prohibition to cases where “such nudity constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic
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no doubt that the categorical exclusion created by Ferber is
recognized by the Court as an exception to the First Amendment’s
114
protection when it comes to production, distribution and possession.
So the question is: Would teen sexting and other autopornography
fall within this unprotected category?
B. Basic Content of the Unprotected Category

Although factual scenarios of teen sexting and autopornography
were surely not in the Court’s contemplation when it decided
115
Ferber, there is little doubt that its newly fashioned category could
116
Pictures of explicit conduct that
easily be read to include them.
teenagers take of themselves and send to their friends, classmates,
and others would first of all come squarely within the wording of the
117
statutory prohibition that the Ferber case specifically upheld. And
the Court’s “category of child pornography which . . . is unprotected
118
119
by the First Amendment,” is evidently larger still.
At its outer limits, the Ferber exclusion from constitutional
protection could conceivably include anything that a broad reading of

focus on the genitals, and where the person depicted is neither the child nor the ward of
the person charged.” Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112–13. As explained by the Court, “once a
statute is authoritatively construed, there is no longer any danger that protected speech
will be deterred and therefore no longer any reason to entertain the defendant’s challenge
to the statute on its face.” Id. at 115 n.12.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct 1830, 1836, 1839 (2008); Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002).
115. The case came down long before the era of ubiquitous cell phones and cheap
digital photography. If teens of the Ferber era wanted to share naked pictures of
themselves, they had to either locate a compliant pharmacy or photo lab to process their
films or get a hold of a Polaroid.
116. While the Supreme Court has said, as noted earlier, that “depictions of nudity,
without more,” are protected, the lower courts have held that, even without nudity,
photographs can be deemed to show a “lascivious display of the genitals” and therefore
constitute illegal child pornography. See supra note 16. Obviously, with all this flux and
blur around the meaning of “nudity, without more,” any teen who takes nude or seminude pictures of herself is, as a practical matter, in definite legal jeopardy.
117. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
118. New York v. Ferber, 485 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
119. For example, the statute in Ferber defined the prohibited material as visual
representations that include certain specified kinds of “sexual conduct” (actual or
simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation,
sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals). Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751. But
the Supreme Court nowhere indicated that it meant to limit “sexual conduct” to only
those acts described in the statute before it. And, obviously, the generic term “sexual
conduct” could include a wider range of actions than was specified in the Ferber statute;
e.g., fondling, voyeurism, and lascivious exhibition of female breasts, just to name a few.
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the words “child pornography” would connote, thus encompassing
120
any pornography that depicts sexual conduct or lewdness by minors,
whether by means of images or words. This reading would by
definition include all autopornography and sexting by teens under
eighteen. It is clear, however, that the Court did not intend to create
so broad an exception from First Amendment protection: “There are,
of course, limits,” it wrote, “on the category of child pornography
121
which, like obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment.”
While the Court did not undertake to fashion a comprehensive
definition of child pornography, analogous to the Miller definition of
obscenity, it did give some guidance.
For instance, the Court said that “the nature of the harm to be
combated requires that the . . . offense be limited to works that
122
visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age.”
And, the Court added, “descriptions or other depictions of sexual
conduct . . . which do not involve live performance or photographic or
other visual reproduction of live performances, retain[] First
123
Amendment protection.”
This limitation indicates that teenagers’
sexual text messages, text-only emails and the like, no matter how
124
lurid or suggestive, would normally
not be constitutionally
punishable.
On the other hand, the Court made clear that the legal definition
of child pornography is not limited by the various criteria set out in
the test of legal obscenity from Miller v. California (prurient appeal,
125
patently offensive, no serious value).
Accordingly, images and

120. In Miller, the Court quoted a definition of “pornography” that included any
“portrayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement.” Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 20 n.2 (1973); but cf. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498
(1985) (comparing “good, old fashioned, healthy” sexual excitement with “shameful or
morbid” excitement). See supra note 60.
121. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 764–65 (anticipating a point that was at the core of a later case, Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 264 (2002), which held that Congress would not
constitutionally prohibit “virtual” child pornography, made without using actual children).
124. The word “normally” is due to United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct 1830, 1842
(2008). The Williams case held that “offers to provide or requests to obtain child
pornography are categorically excluded from the First Amendment,” thus upholding 18
U.S.C. section 2252A(a)(3)(B), which punishes anyone who “advertises, promotes,
presents, distributes, or solicits” child pornography. So under Williams, a text message
that says “Hey! Check my hot nude pics on Facebook! CUL8R” could put a teen in prison
for five to twenty years. Williams, 128 S. Ct at 1837.
125. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764–65. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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video can fall within the Court’s new unprotected category even if
they have serious value, are not “patently offensive” and totally lack
126
The Court’s reasoning was that the presence or
prurient appeal.
absence of, for example, prurient appeal “bears no connection to the
issue of whether a child has been physically or psychologically
127
harmed in the production of the work.”
Perhaps the Court’s most laden specification of scope for the new
category came when it said, ambiguously, “[t]he category of ‘sexual
128
conduct’ proscribed must also be suitably limited and described.”
The Court did not elaborate on what kinds of scope limitations the
word “suitably” might refer to or allow. Nonetheless, the insertion of
this capacious adverb has left the door open, at very least, for courts
to later decide that whole classes of depictions deserve constitutional
protection and need to be kept outside the broad reach of the new
categorical exclusion. Already for example the Court has consistently
recognized that, even in the child context, “depictions of nudity,
129
without more, constitute protected expression.”
The question
inevitably poses itself: Would it be constitutionally “suitable” for
130
legislatures to make it a crime, with severe penalties, for a teenager
131
to visually record and document her own lawful sexuality?
C. Are the Contours of the ‘Categorical Exclusion’ Limited by the
Harms to be Combated? The Answer in Ferber

The reason the Court carved out a categorical exclusion for child
pornography in Ferber was, as it later put it, “the State’s interest in
132
protecting the children exploited by the production process.” More

126. Id. at 764.
127. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761. In the passage quoted from, the Court does indeed speak
to the prurient interest of the “average person,” but its point seems to be that the focus
should be on the harm to the child, not on the excitations experienced by the media
consumer. Cf. Adler, supra note 16, at 946–61 (describing how a number of lower court
decisions seem to lose sight of this distinction).
128. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (emphasis added).
129. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990) (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765, n.18).
See supra notes 16 & 113.
130. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
131. An alternative and much less capacious reading of “suitably” is that it merely
meant to require the wording of the statutory prohibitions to be appropriately precise. Cf.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
132. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002). Accord United States v.
Williams, 128 S. Ct 1830, 1838 (2008) (“[T]he child-protection rationale for speech
restriction does not apply to materials produced without children.”). See quotations from
Ferber itself in text immediately following.
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particularly, the Ferber court gave several reasons why “the States are
entitled to greater leeway” in regulating the production and
133
distribution of “pornographic depictions of children.” In summary,
these reasons are:
1. The “sexual exploitation and abuse of children” that occurs
134
in the production of the materials.
2. The intrinsic relationship between the sexual abuse of
135
children and the distribution of the materials.
Not only are
the materials themselves a circulating “permanent record” of
the child’s “participation” and degradation, but drying up the
market may be the only practical way to stop “the production of
136
material which requires the sexual exploitation of children.”
3. The fact that it is a crime to employ children in producing
child-pornography (“illegal throughout the Nation”), meaning
that advertising and selling child pornography provides “an
economic motive for and are . . . an integral part of” an illegal
137
activity.
4. The lack of any countervailing need for “visual depictions of
children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their
genitals” as an “important and necessary part of a literary
138
performance or scientific or educational work.”

Based on these reasons, the Ferber Court concluded that “the
evil to be restricted . . . overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive
interests, if any, at stake” and “it is permissible to consider these
139
materials as without the protection of the First Amendment.”

133. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756.
134. Id. at 757 (describing this as a “government objective of surpassing importance”).
135. Id. at 759.
136. Id. at 760 (“The most expeditious if not the only practical method of enforcement
may be to dry up the market.”).
137. Id. at 761–62. Note that the illegal activity the Court was referring to in this third
factor was the production of child-pornography materials, which might seem to assume the
very point in issue. However, it appears clear from the opinion’s subsequent discussion in
the same paragraph that the crucial illegality was the “employment of children” in creating
the media (which is, of course, conduct and not speech or expression) rather than the
illegality of the recording process itself (which is essentially pure “speech”).
138. Id. at 762–63. The reason for the lack of need, the Court suggests, is that a
“person over the statutory age could be used” or simulation could “provide an alternative.”
The Court also listed a “fifth” reason, one which justifies the “categorical” character of the
exclusion from First Amendment protection. It is, however, of a different order from the
other four listed in the text and is discussed supra Part III.A.
139. Id. at 763–64.
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But do these reasons for creating the categorical exclusion also
serve to limit its scope? That is, did the Court intend the categorical
exclusion to encompass broadly all visual “pornographic depictions of
140
children,” or did it intend the exclusion to be tailored, so it would
only cover media produced in ways that caused the harms that the
141
Court actually identified? Suppose, hypothetically, that there is no
resulting harm when teenagers take non-obscene but sexually explicit
pictures of themselves (say, a teen at a mirror with a camera phone),
neither the kinds of harms referred to in Ferber nor otherwise.
Would it follow that such “harm-free” autopornography would ipso
facto fall outside of the Ferber categorical exclusion (and, therefore,
be constitutionally protected) on the ground that it causes no harm?
142
Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa legis.
There is good reason to think the answer to this hypothetical is
no. A conservative reading of Ferber is that its unprotected
“category” would include any “visual depictions of children
143
performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals,”
irrespective of whether the process of producing the depictions
144
caused harm to the children involved. In other words, Ferber seems
to say that the scope of the child-pornography “category” is not
limited to materials whose production would generate the harms that
145
the categorical exclusion was based on.
The Ferber opinion provides several reasons that cumulatively
seem to support this interpretation. First, the Court repeatedly
described the new unprotected category by reference to content (e.g.,
146
“pornographic depictions of children”
or, simply, “child

140. Id. at 756.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 132–39.
142. “The reason for the law ceasing, the law also ceases.” United States v.
McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 895 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999). As applied here, the maxim would
refer to the reach of the law in coverage, not in time.
143. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762. The opinion describes the category using several different
verbalizations, but this one seems to best capture all the essential ingredients.
144. Note that all we are talking about at the moment is what speech falls into the
category, not whether particular “harm-free” sexting or autopornography might ultimately
receive constitutional protection anyway. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773–74 (acknowledging
that some protected speech may be swept into the unprotected category and need to be
“cured through case-by-case analysis”). But cf. supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
145. It might be added here that in the federal appellate courts the contours of the
child-pornography “category” have not been limited to materials whose production
generates the harms at which the categorical exclusion was aimed. See Adler, supra note
16, at 946–61.
146. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756.
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147

pornography” ), not by reference to the harms to be prevented, viz.
“materials produced by exploitation” or the like. Second, the Court
likened the “category of child pornography” to the category of
148
149
150
obscenity, which is, of course, “unabashedly” content-based.
Finally, the Court as much as conceded that a statute within the
unprotected category could conceivably “forbid the distribution of
material . . . which does not threaten the harms sought to be
151
combated by the State.” Indeed, noting that the state court below
“was understandably concerned that some protected expression,
ranging from medical textbooks to pictorials in the National
152
Geographic would fall prey to the statute,” the Court specifically
provided for this eventuality when it said that “whatever overbreadth
153
may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis.”
True, at one point in the opinion, the Court thickly implied that
the constitutional contours of the child-pornography category should
be limited by the Court’s child-protection rationale for creating it. It
wrote “the nature of the harm to be combated requires” that the
154
offense be limited to visual depictions of sexual conduct. However,
this statement provides at best only ambiguous support for the notion
that the Court meant to tailor the categorical exclusion overall to
cover only materials whose production threatened the harms relied
on in Ferber. Although the statement can be read to imply that such

147. E.g., id. at 763, 764.
148. Id. at 764 (“the category of child pornography which, like obscenity, is
unprotected . . .”).
149. Id. at 756.
150. As defined in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See supra text
accompanying note 59.
151. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766.
152. Id. at 773.
153. Id. at 774. Strictly speaking the Court is talking here about possible overbreadth
of the state’s content-based statute, not overbreadth of its own content-based category.
However, if the content banned by the statute is within the Court’s unprotected category,
then there could be no possibility of statutory overbreadth (i.e., no need for case-by-case
cure) unless the category were defined by something broader than the harm-prevention in
view. Put the other way, if the Court’s category were limited by harm-prevention in view,
a statute falling within it could not be “overbroad.” Therefore, this statement shows that
the Court must have understood that its new unprotected category could be potentially
broader than (i.e., not limited by) the harm-prevention in view.
154. Id. at 764 (emphasis in original). And, as likewise noted earlier, it stipulated that
the proscriptions of child-pornography statutes must relate to “sexual conduct” that is
“suitably limited and described.” Id. (emphasis added). This leaves open the possibility
that an exclusion whose scope exceeded the harm-prevention rationale might not be
“suitable.” See supra text accompanying notes 128–31.
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a harm-based limitation exists, the last three passages quoted in the
155
preceding paragraph practically say flat-out that statutes falling
within the categorical exclusion might forbid content that “does not
156
threaten the harms sought to be combated.”
In sum, Ferber provides little reason to doubt that the new
categorical exclusion was defined by content (albeit justified by harmprevention). Accordingly, it seems fair to conclude that, even in
situations where the Ferber harms do not apply (for example, pictures
that teens take of themselves), the materials would fall within the
categorical exclusion. By its terms, at least, the Ferber decision would
seem to deny First Amendment protection just as much to the teen
with her cell phone at the mirror as it does to the most exploitative
and abusive adult producer of commercial child pornography.
D. Does Ashcroft Modify the Way the Categorical Exclusion is Defined?
157

In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a federal statute that criminalized
so-called “virtual” child pornography, i.e., “sexually explicit images
that appear to depict minors but were produced without using any
158
real children.” The Court concluded that virtual child pornography
159
is (unless obscene) fully protected by the First Amendment.
The
attempt by Congress to expand the Federal pornography definitions
to ban virtual child pornography, wrote the Court, “finds no support
160
in Ferber.”
Because teenage sexting and autopornography are, of course, not
virtual but depict real people, the actual holding of Ashcroft would
give no constitutional shelter to teens who make explicit pictures and
videos of themselves. Indeed, in striking down the attempt to ban
virtual child pornography, the Ashcroft Court did not need to modify
the scope of the categorical exclusion or to define its content in any
way that Ferber had not already anticipated. Ferber had already

155. Supra text accompanying notes 151–53.
156. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766.
157. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
158. Id. at 239. Images generated totally by computer are an example. Id. at 241. The
congressional enactment in question was the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1966,
specifically the portion of that act codified as 18 U.S.C.A. sections 2256(8)(B) and (8)(D).
The first provision expanded the definition of child pornography. The second was an antipandering provision, which will not be separately discussed here.
159. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256.
160. Id. at 251.
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made clear that “the distribution of descriptions or other depictions
of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live
performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of live
161
performances, retains First Amendment protection.”
Even if Ashcroft did not go beyond what Ferber had already
held, however, its language and reasoning were very different.
Throughout the opinion, the Court uses wording and reasons that
seem to presuppose that the unprotected category of child
pornography is not merely justified but also shaped by reference to
the particular harms that motivated its creation. The differences
between Ferber and Ashcroft in their language and reasoning suggest
that the later case represents a clarification or adjustment of the basis
on which the scope the categorical exclusion is to be defined.
For example, in distinguishing virtual child pornography from
material falling under the Ferber categorical exclusion, the Ashcroft
Court wrote that “Ferber’s judgment about child pornography was
162
based upon how it was made, not on what it communicated.”
At
another point the Court said of Ferber: “The production of the work,
163
not its content, was the target of the statute.”
Further, the Court
164
described the post-Ferber holding in Osborne v. Ohio as being
based on “these same interests” and as having been “anchored . . . in
the concern for the participants [in the production], those whom it
165
called the ‘victims of child pornography.’”
Finally, the Court in
Ashcroft noted that Osborne “did not suggest that, absent this
166
concern, other governmental interests would suffice.”
These repeated references to how the pornography is made, as
opposed to what it depicts, are particularly notable in view of what
the Ashcroft decision actually did, namely, it struck down the
Congressional ban on virtual pornography saying it “prohibits speech
167
that records no crime and creates no victims by its production” —

161. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764–65.
162. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250–51 (emphasis added).
163. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249.
164. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
165. Ashcroft, 353 U.S. at 250.
166. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250. Other examples include: “[Ferber] distinguished child
pornography from other sexually explicit speech because of the State’s interest in
protecting the children exploited by the production process,” Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 240;
and, “Where the images are themselves the product of child sexual abuse, Ferber
recognized that the State had an interest in stamping it out without regard to any
judgment about its content,” Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249.
167. Id. at 250.
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i.e., stressing that the invalidated ban did not address the concerns
underlying Ferber and Osborne. It is hard to resist the conclusion
that the Court struck down the virtual pornography ban because it did
not address those concerns.
There are also other salient differences between Ferber and
Ashcroft in their language and analysis.
Whereas Ferber
acknowledged only grudgingly that there might be value in depicting
168
the sexual aspects of young people’s lives, the Ashcroft opinion
devotes considerable space to that value, discussing the “enduring
fascination” that our society has “with the lives and destinies of the
young” and “the vital interest we all have in the formative years we
ourselves once knew, when wounds can be so grievous,
disappointment so profound, and mistaken choices so tragic, but
169
when moral acts and self-fulfillment are still in reach.”
Perhaps the most important difference between Ferber and
Ashcroft is the way in which the Ashcroft Court viewed the nexus
between the unprotected category and crime. In a nutshell, the
Ashcroft opinion seems to view crime prevention as the core reason
why the Court should deny constitutional protection to childpornography materials. The Court seemed to expect moreover that
there should be a rather close connection between targeted speech
and imminent criminal acts before the speech can be justifiably
170
suppressed. In Ferber, by contrast, although the Court mentioned
171
illegal activity, it primarily justified the suppression of speech on the
172
basis of preventing harm.
In short, while Ferber stressed child
168. “The value . . . is exceedingly modest if not de minimis.” New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 762–63 (1982). Cf. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 n.3 (accord on “the value
of permitting child pornography”).
169. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 246–49. The resonant passage, from which these quotes are
taken, penned by Justice Kennedy, quite possibly qualifies as the Supreme Court at its
literary best.
170. See, e.g., id. at 253–54 (“The Government has shown no more than a remote
connection between speech that might encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting
child abuse. Without a significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government
may not prohibit speech on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in
illegal conduct.”) For more quotations from Ashcroft indicating the importance of a
“crime” connection to the unprotected category, see infra text accompanying notes 206–08.
171. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
172. The Court referred to “advertising and selling” as an “integral part” of the crime
of producing child pornography, Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62, but the Court’s decision to
uphold the crime of producing was itself predicated on harms alone, viz. that “the use of
children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful.” Id. at 758. Therefore, the
Ferber Court’s ultimate justification of the categorical exclusion rested on harmprevention. See supra text accompanying notes 132–39. As discussed infra text
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sexual abuse and exploitation as harms, the stress in Ashcroft was on
exploitation and abuse as crimes.
So what, if anything, may have changed as result of Ashcroft’s
differing approach to the categorical exclusion? In the two parts that
follow, we will first consider whether Ashcroft’s interpretation of
Ferber has tied the legitimate reach of the categorical exclusion to the
concerns that actually motivated its creation and, if so, what that
might mean for the constitutional status of teen autopornography.
We will then consider whether Ashcroft’s repeated references to the
173
objective of preventing imminent crime reflect a developing view
that (ordinarily, at least) the harmful acts defining the categorical
exception must be serious enough to be crimes—meaning that
legislatures could not constitutionally prohibit minors from making
non-obscene photographs of their own bodies or visual depictions of
their own legal acts.
E. Limiting the Scope of the Categorical Exclusion to the Concerns
Relied on in Ferber and Osborne

As noted above, the Court in Ashcroft struck down the federal
law on virtual pornography stating it “prohibits speech that records
174
no crime and creates no victims by its production.” This statement
implies a view that the legitimate reach of the categorical exclusion is
narrower than may have been previously thought, a difference that
could dramatically affect the constitutional status of teen sexting and
autopornography. No longer would sexting teenagers be confronted
with the position, apparently accepted by some courts and
175
prosecutors, that the unprotected category includes any content that
visually depicts sexual conduct by minors, i.e., much or most of teen
autopornography. Instead, the categorical exclusion would have a
somewhat tidier scope, one that takes in only those materials which
are actually produced in ways that the categorical exclusion was
intended to address.

accompanying notes 195–205, this de-emphasis of the need for a criminal nexus in Ferber
is understandable considering that, at the time Ferber was decided, at least three states
neither prohibited the use of minors in producing pornographic materials nor prohibited
the distribution of materials depicting minors. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749.
173. See infra text accompanying notes 206–08.
174. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250.
175. For example, in the cases described at the beginning of this Article. See supra text
accompanying notes 1–15.
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On the other hand, if the categorical exclusion is broadly viewed
to include (contrary to the implication of Ashcroft) even
autopornography that “records no crime and creates no victims by its
176
production,” the result could be a categorical exclusion that
overshoots by a wide margin the assumptions and justifications that
support it. Within such a broad categorical exclusion, it may well turn
177
out that the Ferber balance between “the evil to be restricted” and
178
can no longer be
“the expressive interests . . . at stake”
179
“appropriately generalized,” and that would of course jeopardize
the categorical exclusion’s core factual predicate.
Almost certainly the most significant difference between teenage
autopornography and “traditional” child pornography, like the
material in Ferber and Osborne, is the circumstances under which the
two genres are produced. It is highly probable, moreover, that these
different circumstances of production greatly affect their respective
potentials for harm. The harms described in Ferber include various
deleterious effects both immediate and long-range on the children
depicted, but the common theme throughout the case is exploitation.
Indeed, in the Ferber opinion the Court uses or quotes the word
180
“exploit” and its derivatives more than twenty times “[T]he State’s
particular and more compelling interest,” it wrote, is “in prosecuting
181
those who promote the sexual exploitation of children.”
The Court did not define “exploitation,” but it seems clear
enough from context that the Court meant the word in its usual
182
meaning, which connotes a significant disparity in power, misuse of
this disparity, a denial of another’s autonomy, disregard of the

176. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250.
177. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763.
178. Id. at 764.
179. Id. at 763.
180. E.g., Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757 (“The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of
children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.”).
“[T]he
distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production of material
which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled.” Id. at
760 (emphasis added). See also id. at 761 (“the State’s particular and more compelling
interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children”) (emphasis
added). Likewise, Osborne described the state’s aim as “to destroy a market for the
exploitative use of children,” Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (emphasis added),
and referred at least five times to the subjects of the kind of pornography at issue as
“victims,” e.g., Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109, 110 and 111.
181. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
182. “To make unethical use of for one’s own advantage or profit.” WEBSTER’S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY 494 (2d College ed. 1970).
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victim’s wishes or concerns, and a general degradation or impairment
of the victim’s personal dignity—all as a means to accomplish, in this
case, a physical invasion. If the Court was using the word
“exploitation” without the usually associated connotations of power
and abuse, there is nothing in the opinion to indicate it. To say from
the Ferber opinion that the Court meant to include teenagers taking
pictures of themselves would be quite a stretch.
There are several specifics in Ferber tending to confirm that the
Court was using the word “exploitation” in its usual sense, viz. people
taking undue advantage of others—in particular, adults taking
advantage of children. To begin with, the “single question” in the
case concerned “the abuse of children who are made to engage in
183
sexual conduct for commercial purposes.” The word “made” in this
sentence obviously connotes an improper use of disproportionate
power—and it certainly does not bring to mind an idea of people
making photos of themselves, on their own initiative.
In addition to using the word “made,” the question in the case
(like the facts before the Court) notably refers to the “commercial”
purposes for which the pornography at issue was created. To be sure,
the opinion does not limit its reach to commercial pornography, but
the Court does seem to presuppose a commercial context as a
paradigmatic case—another feature implying that the Court’s focus
was on the situation of adults taking advantage of children, not just
children misbehaving on their own. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, of the many studies and reports that the Court cited and
184
relied on in reviewing the “balance of competing interests,” all seem
to have investigated the exploitation of children by adults. If any of
these studies investigated or revealed evidence of harm from anything
185
like teen autopornography, the Court did not mention it.
By contrast, whatever may be the psychological or other harms
of self-motivated and uncoerced acts of sexting or other teen

183. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753 (emphasis added) (“To prevent the abuse of children who
are made to engage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes, could the New York State
Legislature, consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit the dissemination of material
which shows children engaged in sexual conduct, regardless of whether such material is
obscene?”).
184. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764, n.9, n.10, n.11, n.13.
185. Professor Smith points out that neither the influential Final Report of the
Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography of 1986 nor the more recent 2001 ABA
report prepared for the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children mentions the
phenomenon of underage persons taking sexually explicit pictures of themselves. Smith,
supra note 20, at 517–18.
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autopornography, there is no reason to think they are similar in
nature or degree to the outrageously exploitative and abusive harms
relied on in Ferber. The use of children in the production of
“traditional” child pornography entails by its very nature a most
egregious misuse by adults of significant power disparities, coercive
oppression of the child’s autonomy and an assault on the child’s
dignity—not to mention her body. By contrast, teenagers taking
pictures of themselves, on their own initiative for their own purposes,
involves no power relationships, no invasion of autonomy and no
186
attacks on dignity (not, at least, until the government intervenes).
There is, to be sure, one Ferber concern that might apply, at least
in some measure, to the teen sexting situation, namely, that “the
materials produced are a permanent record of the children’s
participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their
187
As explained in Osborne: “The pornography’s
circulation.”
continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm by
188
haunting the children in years to come.” However, the “haunting”
described in both Ferber and Osborne clearly presupposes that there
189
has been underlying “sexual abuse of [the] children” Because teen
autopornography lacks this major element of sexual abuse, any
“haunting” that may follow is factually distinguishable. Of course,
even people who have not been sexually abused may be “haunted” by
images that show them doing things they later decide were foolish.
And the government may arguably have an interest in protecting
people from reminders of their own youthful silliness. Whatever one
may say of this governmental interest, however, it is likely not on par
with the serious concerns that underlay Ferber. It hardly seems an
190
interest “of surpassing importance.”

186. It is possible, of course, to talk of “self-exploitation.” See Leary, supra note 17, at
4. But when the prefix “self-” is appended to “exploitation,” it deprives the word of its
usual interpersonal context and thereby causes it to lose its usual negative connotations of
power disparity, coercion and assault; it becomes, rather, a mere metaphor for a lack of
good judgment and deficit of appropriate personal discipline. Indeed, Professor Leary
offers a definition of “self-exploitation” in which picture-taking itself is the essence, with
none of the negative features that are normally associated with an abusive individual
taking unconscionable advantage another. Id. at 20.
187. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002).
188. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
189. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. Ferber cites this permanent record as one of the ways that
the films were “intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children.” Id.; accord Osborne,
495 U.S. at 111.
190. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
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The main point for present purposes is, however, that
exploitation-produced pornography and the self-produced variety
are, in terms of the harms they involve, two very different genres.
They have entirely different circumstances of production. Because
the whole justification for the categorical exclusion rests on “a
191
balance of competing interests” based on certain underlying facts,
the exclusion lacks its rationale in cases where those underlying facts
are absent. In the case of autopornography, the Ferber rationale for
impinging on free expression is missing. Both Ferber and Osborne
are, in short, factually distinguishable from cases of teen sexting and
autopornography, and their reasons do not justify the suppression of
materials made by teens acting on their own.
Of course, it may turn out that sexting and autopornography are,
in fact, harmful to teens, possibly even harmful enough to outweigh
the teens’ own interests in expressing themselves as they wish. At the
moment, however, this is a question that has not received much study.
Whereas the Court in Ferber had stacks of evidence documenting the
harmful effects of exploitatively produced materials such as the two
films there at issue, we still do not know if anything comparable will
ever be presented on the wholly distinct phenomenon of sexually
explicit pictures that teens take of themselves.
Until evidence is presented that harms of “surpassing” concern
are caused by sexting and autopornography, the Court’s analytical
approach in Ashcroft gives good reason to doubt that the categorical
exclusion can be simply extended to them. The Ashcroft analysis
seems to say that the law should not impinge on expressive matter
whose production does not implicate the concerns that the categorical
exclusion was intended to address. In repeatedly stressing the way
192
that “traditional” child pornography is produced, Ashcroft seemed
to acknowledge that the categorical exclusion for child pornography
should be tailored to address those concerns. Indeed, as noted
earlier, Ashcroft specifically remarked that Osborne “did not suggest
that, absent this concern, other governmental interests would
193
suffice.” Thus, Ashcroft appears at very least to presuppose, if not
hold, that the reach of the categorical exclusion does not extend to
“speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its

191. Id. at 764.
192. Supra text accompanying notes 162–65. As mentioned earlier, Ashcroft also
seemed to identify the acts that cause these harms as crimes. Infra text accompanying
notes 206–08.
193. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002).
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194

production” —the evils that Ferber and Osborne identified and
relied upon.
F.

Linking the Scope of the Categorical Exclusion to Crime Prevention

“It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for
speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an
195
integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”
Thus, for example, in a state where sexual relations between fifteen196
year-olds are considered to be a crime, the visual recording or
documenting of such relations might also be made a crime. If a
purpose to record is what prompted the illegal relations, the crimeprevention link would be there. The only limitation recognized in
197
Ashcroft was the longstanding one which, as reformulated in
198
would require that the targeted
Brandenburg v. Ohio,
communicative acts be “directed to inciting or producing imminent
199
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”
Even though there was clear prior authority for denying
constitutional protection to expressive acts that are an “integral part”
200
of crime, the Court in Ferber made little of it. Instead of crime, the
Court chose to stress harms, namely, the harms that the production of
“traditional” child pornography inflicts on the children who are
201
depicted.
It is understandable why: The Court in Ferber almost
surely did not want the legitimacy or applicability of its new
categorical exclusion to depend on whether the production of the
pornography involved some independent crime, such as child abuse.
For one thing, the two films at issue in Ferber showed boys
202
masturbating, and it is by no means clear that masturbation or
asking others to masturbate was necessarily everywhere a crime.

194. Id.
195. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)).
196. E.g.,in Massachusetts. See Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834 (Mass.
2009) (illustrating selective prosecution of one participant only under Mass. Gen. Laws c.
265, § 23).
197. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251–53.
198. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
199. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
200. It mentioned the criminal nexus in connection with only one of its several
rationales for creating the categorical exclusion. See supra text accompanying note 137.
201. In particular, sexual exploitation and abuse of children, and the continuing harms
generated by ongoing circulation of the record of the abuse. See id.
202. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 752.
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Even more importantly, at the time Ferber was decided there were at
least three states that neither prohibited the use of minors in
producing pornography nor restricted the distribution of pornography
203
that had been made with minors.
This is not to mention the
possible legal status of such production in various foreign countries
204
Whatever the
from which child pornography might be imported.
Court’s reasons, however, the main point is that the Ferber Court
gave no hint that it attached pivotal constitutional significance to the
fact that particular child pornography was the product of a crime or
not. All the Court needed to uphold the suppression of childpornography content was the legislature’s judgment that “the use of
children as subjects . . . is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and
205
mental health of the child.”
The language used by the Court in Ashcroft, by contrast,
repeatedly presupposed that the validity of child pornography laws
requires a sufficiently close connection between the materials being
suppressed and a crime, specifically the crime of child abuse. For
example, the Court practically began its First Amendment discussion
by stating that “[t]he sexual abuse of a child is a most serious
206
crime,” effectively identifying sexual child abuse with crime. Then,
Ashcroft distinguished “virtual” child pornography from unprotected
content saying that, with unprotected content, “the creation of the
speech is itself the crime of child abuse” whereas with virtual child
207
pornography “there is no underlying crime at all.”
And again, in
summarizing the reasoning of the “distribution” part of Ferber, the
Court wrote: “Under either rationale, the speech had what the Court

203. Id. at 749. As the Court stated, “virtually all of the States and the United States
have passed legislation proscribing the production of or otherwise combating ‘child
pornography.’” Id. at 758. Virtually all is, of course, not quite all.
204. The Court specifically confirmed that “the State is not barred by the First
Amendment from prohibiting the distribution of unprotected materials produced outside
the State,” id. at 765–66, partly because it is “often impossible to determine where such
material is produced and partly because “maintenance of the market itself ‘leaves open
the financial conduit by which the production of such material is funded and materially
increases the risk that [local] children will be injured.’” Id. at 766 n.19. The second of
these two reasons is, of course, probably not germane to the casual teen autopornography
context. However, the fact that the Court regarded the place of production as irrelevant
seems to be a confirmation that the Court did not mean to limit Ferber to materials that
were produced illegally. See United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 247–48 (3d Cir. 2008)
(dissenting opinion).
205. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.
206. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) (emphasis added).
207. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 254 (emphasis added).
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in effect held was a proximate link to the crime from which it came.”
In sum, it looks very much as though the Ashcroft majority, at least in
its choice of words, has replaced mere harm-prevention with crimeprevention as the normal constitutional requisite for suppressing
speech. No concurring or dissenting opinion in Ashcroft objected to
this re-interpretation of Ferber.
Linking the scope of the categorical exclusion to crime, as
opposed to mere harm, could of course have a major impact on the
constitutional status of teen sexting and autopornography. It is not a
crime to be naked at home, or even to be lewd. Nor, usually, is it
even illegal for persons between sixteen and eighteen to engage in
sexual relations with each other or (depending on the state) with
209
people who are older. When sexting and autopornography are used
to record and document entirely legal conduct, there is, in the words
210
So to the extent that
of Ashcroft, “no underlying crime at all.”
statutes purport to ban teen autopornography depicting completely
legal activities, the only behavior that the statutes end up
criminalizing are the acts of recording, documenting and
communicating—in effect making crimes out of essentially pure
expression.
In fact, even when teens record their own illegal sexual conduct,
it is not a foregone conclusion that there is a sufficient nexus to
“crime” to justify a ban on the recording. “The prospect of crime . . .
211
by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech.”
The
212
crucial Brandenburg connection would presumably need to be
213
shown, and this may not be easy. While a purpose to produce
“traditional” child pornography may give deviant adults an incentive
214
to sexually exploit and abuse children, it is doubtful that the modern

208. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
209. See id. at 246–47. In most states, the age of consent is sixteen. See Avert.com,
Worldwide Ages of Consent, http://www.avert.org/age-of-consent.htm.
210. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 254. “If the law considers a minor to be old enough to
choose to engage in the adult act of having sex, they should also be treated as old enough
to decide to record their own sexual exploits.” Smith, supra note 20.
211. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 245 (“Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be
applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not
abridgment of the rights of free speech.” (quoting from Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959))).
212. See supra notes 198–99.
213. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253–54, recognized Brandenburg to be good law in this very
context.
214. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982).
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teenager’s interest in sex depends on being able to record it. If laws
forbidding inter-teen sex acts are not enough to deter teenagers’
sexual conduct, it is not likely that bans on taking pictures would
215
make it “dry up” either. Conceivably there may be some underage
sexual activity that is prompted by the presence of a camera, but even
at that, “[t]he mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is
216
not a sufficient reason for banning it.”
In terms of the familiar
217
Brandenburg requirements of imminence and likelihood, the idea is
risible that a “likely” factor motivating underage sex is the chance to
make a recording.
In addition to Ashcroft’s implicit presupposition that a crime
nexus should normally be required to ban non-obscene pornography,
there is a trend in a group of analogous cases that also supports this
conclusion. The analogous group begins with a case from the Ferber
era, Posadas de Puerto Rico Association v. Tourism Company of
218
Puerto Rico. In Posadas, as in Ferber, the Court upheld a ban on
speech that was an intrinsic part of a harmful but lawful activity. The
harmful but lawful activity in Posadas was casino gambling, and the
prohibited speech was casino advertising. The Court in Posadas
upheld the prohibition on speech as a harm-prevention measure and,
in doing so, was consistent with Ferber: Neither case required there to
be a nexus between the prohibited speech and crime; harmprevention alone sufficed to ban speech.
Since 1996, however, the Court has retreated from its Posadas
position, generally holding that truthful promotion of lawful activities
is constitutionally protected—even if the activities being promoted
219
might easily be deemed harmful.
While this line of cases is, as
noted, only analogous, it does provide a historical perspective on

215. Cf. id. at 760 (asserting that law enforcement was constitutionally permitted to
indirectly attack the problem of child pornography production by bans of advertising and
distribution that would “dry up” the market).
216. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 198–99.
218. Posadas de P. R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P. R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
219. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999); see
also 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). Perhaps the most important
change from Posadas was the repudiation of the idea that the legislative power to regulate
an activity includes within it the power to restrict speech that tends to stimulate that
activity. Compare Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345–46, with Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S at 182–
83, and 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 508–14. Since legislatures have the power to prohibit
almost anything (subject only to “rational basis” review), the Posadas “greater includes
the lesser” idea would have essentially spelled the end of higher levels of scrutiny for any
law curbing speech as a means of addressing some other social ill.
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Ferber. It shows a history in which the Court seems to have lost its
onetime enthusiasm for legislative strategies that impose bans on
speech as a way to regulate non-speech behavior. Whereas the Court
in Posadas seemed to see speech regulations as a valid tool for
dealing with harmful non-speech conduct, the cases since 1996 have
instead been protective of free expression, requiring legislatures to
address non-speech evils by means that are more direct: If a
legislature wants to ban certain conduct, then it should ban it
outright, and not just ban speech that is thought to promote it—in
effect, a rule of “no crime, no ban.”
Indeed, apart from the short-lived Posadas detour, the
constitutional legitimacy of content-based restrictions for pure “harm
220
prevention” reasons, is not well developed.
Except for child
pornography and protecting various aspects of government
221
it is hard to think of examples.
This is
administration,
understandable. After all, the Framers were surely aware that free
speech and press could have downsides. They certainly knew that
competing interests would continually arise and present themselves as
being more worthy than free speech and press. However, the
judgment embodied in the First Amendment is that, with rare
222
exceptions, the interest in free expression should prevail. True, the
Court has recognized that certain categories of content were, from the
outset, never meant to go unrestricted (among those commonly
mentioned are threats, incitement to crime, “fighting words” and
223
obscenity ). However, the asserted interests in preventing evils from
harmful-but-lawful acts are a particularly dangerous basis for
restricting free expression. For if all the courts and legislatures need
to do to withdraw First Amendment is to convince themselves that

220. “One scholar notes that ‘a majority of the Court has never sustained a regulation
that was strictly scrutinized for content discrimination reasons.’” See Barry P. McDonald,
Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of
Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1365 n.63 (2006), quoted in United States v.
Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 247–48 (3d Cir. 2008) (striking down a federal statute prohibiting
depictions of cruelty to animals). And the Court itself has said “we readily acknowledge
that a law rarely survives [strict] scrutiny.” Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200 (1992)
(upholding a law, indeed, withstood strict scrutiny). Of course, the reason that content
discrimination has rarely survived strict scrutiny may simply be that, in any situation where
there is a non-speech harm to be addressed, it should be relatively easy (and make good
sense) to draw or construe the legislation to be content-neutral, so that it calls for
“intermediate” rather than strict scrutiny. See infra note 233.
221. E.g., courts’ gag rules. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
222. See infra text accompanying notes 231–33 and 241–42.
223. See Stevens, 533 F.3d at 224 (en banc).
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some non-expression interest is more worthy than speech, the basic
224
judgment embodied in the First Amendment is in trouble.
So, with this background in mind, we return to the question: Do
225
the Court’s repeated references in Ashcroft to crime reflect an
emerging principle that visual recordings, documentation and
communication about legal activities will normally be entitled to First
Amendment protection? For millions of otherwise law-abiding
teenagers, the answer to this question could mean the difference
between already being a felony sex offender (albeit unindicted) or,
alternatively, ordinary Americans enjoying their constitutionally
protected rights of free expression. The language of Ashcroft and the
parallel analogous trend in the post-Posadas line of cases, along with
the very rarity of pure non-crime rationales for speech suppression,
all would support an affirmative answer, namely, that statutes
suppressing speech must ordinarily be justified by a purpose to
prevent acts that are not merely harmful, but criminal.
G. Scrutiny Needed to Define the Scope of Categorical Exclusions

The Court in Ferber gave compelling reasons for concluding that
the statute in that case was constitutional as applied to the particular
films at issue. However, the Court did not confine its conclusions to
the particular statute or films but, instead, extended its holding to
embrace a whole broad “category” of content—all visual depictions
of sexual conduct made involving minors. Moreover, the Court
rejected contentions that the statute in question was overbroad,
saying “we seriously doubt” that the “arguably impermissible
applications of the statute amount to more than a tiny fraction of the
226
materials within the statute’s reach.” Although the new categorical
227
exclusion would reach even more content than the statute, the
Court evidently did not believe that the exclusion was “overbroad,”
228
either.
But what if the reasons and factual basis for the Ferber
categorical exclusion, so well documented and substantiated in 1982,
do not necessarily apply to an extensive new class of
communications—sexting and autopornography—whose current

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

This point is discussed further infra text accompanying notes 236–43.
See supra text accompanying notes 206–08.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982).
See supra notes 119 and 153.
See supra notes 143–56.
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popularity, and even existence, were probably not imagined when
Ferber was decided? The Ferber Court said it was able to create a
broad “categorical” exclusion because the balance of interests could
be “appropriately generalized . . . within . . . the given
229
classification.” It is possible that, since 1982, new social facts have
emerged, and we cannot be sure that the original balance of interests,
230
from 1982, can still be “appropriately generalized” to much of the
content now falling within the categorical exclusion. This question of
the balance of interests is, of course, one that goes to the very heart of
the justification for creating and continuing the Ferber categorical
exclusion. It must then be asked, what level of scrutiny is appropriate
for considering and answering such a question?
Ordinarily, when a statute imposes “content-based” restrictions
on speech or press, the restrictions are presumptively
231
unconstitutional, and the courts are supposed to use strict scrutiny
232
in reviewing the legislature’s determinations. Strict scrutiny means
that the content-based restriction “must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest,” and “[i]f a less
restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the
233
legislature must use that alternative.”

229. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763–64.
230. See supra Part E.
231. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 816–17 (2000) (“[T]he
Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”); R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,
535 U.S. 425, 434, 449 (2002) (plurality opinion and Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing
rule); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986) (recognizing rule). See also
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461–62 (1980) (“When government regulation discriminates
among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates
that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the
justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized” (citing
Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 97–98 (1972) (explaining equal protection
origins of using the strict scrutiny standard for reviewing content-based discriminations of
speech))).
232. A “content-based speech restriction . . . can stand only if it satisfies strict
scrutiny.” Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989)).
233. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (citations omitted). By contrast, a more relaxed
“intermediate” level of scrutiny and greater deference applies when a legislative burden
on expression is “content-neutral,” i.e., based not on what is communicated but on its
secondary effects, see, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
([R]estrictions must be “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, . . .
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.”); Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S.
at 41. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 440 (plurality opinion) (“[M]unicipal ordinances
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Due to the categorical exclusion, however, this presumption of
unconstitutionality is effectively reversed for sexually explicit visual
234
By placing such depictions into an
depictions of minors.
unprotected “category,” the Court has removed the requirement of
strict scrutiny that would otherwise apply. Child pornography falling
within the categorical exclusion is, in other words, essentially like any
other kind of product, and statutory restrictions on it require only
“rational basis” review—thus leaving legislatures effectively free
235
under the police power to regulate or ban it as they see fit.
As a
receive only intermediate scrutiny if they are content neutral.”), or on the harms incurred
in its production. The distinction between content-based and content-neutral is delineated
in some detail in Turner Broadcast System v. FCC. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 641–42 (1994) (Apparently this is the first majority-subscribed opinion to refer to
“intermediate” scrutiny as the proper standard for content-neutral speech). For further
discussion of the intermediate scrutiny standard in relation to Ferber and Osborne, see
infra note 254.
A statutory restriction on child pornography, such as that in Ferber, could conceivably be
considered “content-neutral,” rather than content-based, inasmuch as it is aimed not at
what is communicated but at the secondary effects that are caused by the manner of
production. See, e.g., Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 41; United States v O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968); see Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 425 (plurality opinion). There is indication in
Ferber that the Court in fact saw the restrictions on child pornography as content-neutral.
For example, the Court described the “context” of the case as “involving the harmful
employment of children” to make the films at issue—clearly referring to conduct
(“employment”), which is regulable under the police power, rather than “pure”
expression. Ferber, 458 U.S at 771. Likewise, it was clear that the Court saw the statute’s
primary aim as being to stop the “use of children as subjects of pornographic materials.”
Ferber, 458 U.S. 758. And throughout the opinion there are repeated references to what
could now be called the “secondary effects” of sexual exploitation and abuse of children as
the concerns that underlay the holding. Had the Court treated the Ferber restriction as
content-neutral, a modern consequence would be that strict scrutiny would not be called
for in reviewing the statute; the proper standard of review would, instead, be
“intermediate” scrutiny—more relaxed but still probably more rigorous (on the question
of alternatives) than the standard that the Court actually did employ. By openly treating
the Ferber statute as content-neutral, however, the Court would have not been readily
able to justify the creation of a new content-based categorical exclusion—and thereby
authorize sweeping statutory bans of all child pornography.
234. Compare Playboy, 529 U.S. at 817 (presumption of invalidity of content-based
restrictions) with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486–87 (1957) (no justifications need
be shown if a categorical exclusion applies). It is actually not clear who has the burden of
persuasion or what the standard is for the “case-by-case analysis” that the Court provided
for in Ferber. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.747, 773–74 (1982). However, the practical
effect of a categorical exclusion is to reverse the presumption in favor of free expression
and to place the speaker of protected speech on the defensive. This practical effect would
be felt as chilling on protected speech irrespective of the speaker’s precise technical
posture while later defending himself in court. Given the severe criminal penalties
involved, it may even, indeed, have an unconstitutional effect on speech. See supra note 93.
235. Well, perhaps not quite. As the Court said in R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377 (racist-type
“fighting words”), unprotected categories of expression are not “entirely invisible” to the

6 - HUMBACH_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

476

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

2/16/2010 6:06 PM

[Vol. 37:3

result, statutes that prescribe severe penalties on teen sexting and
autopornography require virtually no scrutiny at all insofar as the
teen-produced material is unprotected speech.
But there is an important threshold question here: How high
should the bar be when Court itself creates a content-based
236
237
category of unprotected speech? If the Court uses a standard of
strict scrutiny to review content-based impingements on speech by
legislatures, what level of scrutiny should the Court “require” itself to
observe when it defines and maintains an unprotected category?
Although the Realpolitik of the matter may be that the Court can do
anything it wants, elementary principles of legality would require
that, before the judicial branch withdraws constitutional protection
from a whole category of expression, there needs to be a well
demonstrated reason for doing so. After all, in taking the initiative to
create the unprotected category, the Court is not only frankly acting
as a lawmaker writing new law. It is cutting a piece out of the
Constitution.
The analytical role played by categorical exclusions suggests the
degree of scrutiny that would logically apply when the Court creates
such an exclusion and defines its scope. Normally, “[w]hen the
Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of
238
proving the constitutionality of its actions.” The most basic effect of
a categorical exclusion is, as just stated, to reverse this presumption of
239
Operationally, the
invalidity for content-based regulations.
categorical exclusion allows the courts to skip the usual process of
strict scrutiny (demanding a compelling interest, narrow tailoring and

Constitution. Based on R.A.V., one might suppose, for example, that strict scrutiny could
be invoked to strike down a child-pornography law that banned depictions of homosexual
but not heterosexual conduct.
236. It perhaps needs emphasis that a content-based categorical exclusion, such as the
Court created in Ferber, must not be confused with a content-based regulation created by
legislation. Their effects and consequences for speech are exactly opposite. The function
of a content-based regulation, such as a statute, is to suppress the targeted speech, and, as
such, it is presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny. See supra text
accompanying notes 231–33. By contrast, a content-based categorical exclusion suppresses
nothing at all in itself, but it effectively reverses the presumption of unconstitutionality
that would otherwise apply, and thus relieves the government of the need to satisfy the
usual tests of strict scrutiny.
237. Not that the Supreme Court creates new categories all that often. It has not, for
example, done so in the 25 years since Ferber. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 244
(3d Cir. 2008)(en banc).
238. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 234–35.
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240

absence of less restrictive alternatives).
And this is a lot of
protection to skip.
For example, when a regulation on speech has a broad reach, the
government ordinarily has an “especially heavy burden . . . to explain
241
why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective.”
A
categorical exclusion operates to relieve the government of this
burden. And whereas a governmental body that wants to impose
content-based restrictions ordinarily has to “demonstrate that the
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate
242
them to a material degree,” a categorical exclusion allows the
affected speech to be suppressed without demonstrating anything at
all.
In short, a content-based categorical exclusion effectively shortcircuits the strict scrutiny that otherwise normally protects expression
from content-based restrictions. This being so, the only way to
preserve the integrity of the presumption of unconstitutionality (i.e.,
the presumption in favor of free speech) is to provide at the beginning
what will be lost down the line. That is, in creating and shaping a
categorical exclusion, the courts should use the same degree of strict
scrutiny that the categorical exclusion will displace. This would mean
that, in defining a categorical exclusion, a court should have a strong
basis for concluding that (1) there are compelling interests that
outweigh the interest in free expression across the entire category, (2)
the category is narrowly defined to serve those compelling other
interests, and (3) there are no less restrictive alternatives for
243
achieving the same purpose.
If the Court in Ferber and Osborne used strict scrutiny in
establishing and applying the categorical exclusion for child
244
pornography, it did not give voice to the process.
In Ferber, for
240. See supra text accompanying notes 231–33.
241. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997).
242. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–771 (1993).
243. Cf. supra text accompanying note 233.
244. For a discussion of the Court’s rather anomalously low rigor of review, see Adler
supra note 16, 936–38 (characterizing the Supreme Court as “strangely acquiescent “in
Ferber compared with its more typical approach, under which “when the Court eliminates
a category of expression from constitutional protection, it carefully defines the speech that
can be banned; the definition then serves as a limit on legislative enactments”). See also
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984) (“In such cases [of categorically
unprotected speech], the Court has regularly conducted an independent review of the
record both to be sure that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected
category and to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably
narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited.”)
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example, no standard of review was actually mentioned, and the
Court simply said: “We shall not second-guess this legislative
judgment” and “[]that judgment, we think, easily passes muster under
the First Amendment.” Similarly in Osborne, the Court mentioned
no level of scrutiny and concluded, deferentially: “we cannot fault”
245
the state for making the choice that it did. These rather acquiescent
locutions do not, of course, capture the current constitutional rigor of
strict scrutiny. Moreover, the Osborne opinion apparently relied
significantly on the state’s bald assertion that the Court’s earlier
Ferber decision had made it “difficult, if not impossible, to solve the
child pornography problem by only attacking production and
distribution”—along with the fact that a minority of states had “found
246
it necessary” to prohibit possession.
All in all, the analysis in
neither case showed anything more than a kind of partial strict
scrutiny, essentially focusing only on the element of “compelling”
state interest.
Given the historical context of Ferber and Osborne, however, we
should not be surprised that the Supreme Court’s scrutiny in those
two cases was so relaxed and deferential compared with the standards
of strict scrutiny currently applied: After all, both decisions came well
before the Court had definitively declared that strict scrutiny is the
standard of review for content-based regulations affecting sexually
247
themed materials. In a case decided four years before Ferber, the
245. “Given the importance of the State’s interest in protecting the victims of child
pornography, we cannot fault Ohio for attempting to stamp out this vice at all levels in the
distribution chain.” Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990) (emphasis added).
The problem with “acquiescent” scrutiny that so largely defers to legislative judgments is,
of course, that it sets the bar so low that it amounts, in the words of Justice Scalia, “to a
test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff.” Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1025 n.12 (1992).
246. 495 U.S. at 110–11. Justice Brennan found the last point utterly unconvincing,
observing that a “restriction on speech cannot be justified by such self-referential
reasoning.” Id. at 143 n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
247. Despite Sable Communications, the applicable standard of scrutiny seems to have
still been up in the air until after 1996. Compare Denver Area Educ. Telecommc’ns
Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 741–43 (1996) and id. at 781–88 (Kennedy, J. dissenting)
with Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (giving the challenged restriction “the most
stringent review of its provisions”); cf. also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513
U.S. 64, 84 (1994) (Scalia, J. dissenting). Indeed, between the time of Ferber and Osborne,
the Court’s focus was more on reserving strict scrutiny for content-based bans on “political
speech” and settling into the idea of (as yet, unnamed) “intermediate” scrutiny for other
speech restrictions. Compare Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (political demonstration)
with Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (time, place and manner). See
also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (regulations on solicitation of
money by charities subject to “exacting” scrutiny”). Cf. Justice Scalia’s observation,
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plurality opinion of the Court expressed the view that materials of
largely erotic interest are not entitled to the same degree of
constitutional protection as other expression:
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not
tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some
arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest in
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political
debate . . . . Even though the First Amendment protects
communication in this area from total suppression, we hold that
the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as
248
the basis for placing them in a different classification . . .

This deprecatory view towards sexually themed materials,
though never drawing a majority of the Court, appeared in other
249
earlier opinions as well. It seems, in other words, that Ferber and
written several years later in 1996: “We have no established criterion for ‘intermediate
scrutiny’ either, but essentially apply it when it seems like a good idea to load the dice.”
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
Nowadays, however, it is clear that a “content-based speech restriction . . . can stand only
if it satisfies strict scrutiny.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
813 (2000). “As we consider a content-based regulation, the . . . standard is strict scrutiny.
This case involves speech alone; and even where speech is indecent and enters the home,
the objective of shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the
protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative.” Playboy, 529 U.S. at 814;
accord Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 262–63 (2002).
Not that drive-by “strict scrutiny” does not sometimes seem to still occur in the postPlayboy era. For example, Justice O’Connor essentially repeats uncritically the
conclusions of the congressional findings and expresses some free-floating unease about
what might occur “given the rapid pace of advances in computer-graphics technology.”
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 263–64 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Like the Chief Justice, Justice O’Connor based her standard of scrutiny on a case
that involved “content-neutral” regulations and that preceded by several years the case,
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 814, that definitively established strict scrutiny as the proper
standard. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 264, (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195
(1997) (stating that it is proper to “accord substantial deference to the predictive judgment
of Congress” in First Amendment cases)).
248. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70–71 (1976) (emphasis added)
(plurality opinion). Also, “there is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition
of material that is on the borderline between pornography and artistic expression than in
the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance.” Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
249. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978). “While some of these
references [to excretory and sexual organs and activities] may be protected, they surely lie
at the periphery of First Amendment concern.” Id. (emphasis added); United States v. XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 84 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“[T]he First
Amendment protection accorded to such materials is not as extensive as that accorded to
other speech.”).
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Osborne, in their relatively deferential level of scrutiny, simply
reflected the tenor of their times. They do not, however, accord with
the Court’s more recent holding announced in United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., namely, that “the . . . standard is
250
strict scrutiny.”
In sum, while the relatively passive scrutiny in Ferber and
Osborne was fitting for their times, a substantial movement in the
surrounding legal terrain has occurred since the two cases were
decided. As a result, content-based restrictions, including those on
sexually-themed expression, are presumptively unconstitutional, and
251
strict scrutiny is the normal standard for reviewing such restrictions.
Given this move to align and harmonize the protection that is
accorded to various expressive themes and to clarify the standards of
review, the scrutiny that sufficed in 1982 to define the scope of the
categorical exclusion in Ferber should not be expected to suffice
today. Indeed, for the Court to employ its former deferential
approach to define the scope of categorical exclusions today would
252
build a road around the modern strict-scrutiny standard.
The Court’s relaxed level of review in Ferber and Osborne does
not mean, of course, that the legislative judgments in those cases
could not have withstood strict scrutiny. Given the exploitative
factual background in both cases, they almost surely could have. It is
not, however, so obvious that those judgments, if applied to genres of
materials produced under completely different factual circumstances,
253
254
could satisfy strict scrutiny or even, intermediate scrutiny review.
250. 529 U.S. at 813. See supra note 247.
251. Id.; supra notes 231–33 and 247, and text accompanying note 238.
252. It would eviscerate the rule that “[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the
Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.” Playboy,
529 U.S. at 816.
253. See supra notes 231–33.
254. The problem with satisfying intermediate scrutiny is that laws of the sort that were
upheld in Ferber and Osborne impose a complete ban, not a mere restriction, on the
speech content at which they are directed. They would not, therefore, meet the usual
requirement of intermediate scrutiny that the law “leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47, 53–54 (1986). See supra note 233.
There is, however, also an alternative formulation of the intermediate scrutiny standard,
one which does not require “alternative channels,” yet laws like those in Ferber and
Osborne would not (as applied to self-produced genres) seem to satisfy it either. Under
this alternative formulation, a content-neutral regulation will be sustained “if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest.” Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994)
(quoting United States v O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). This requirement of “narrow
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As observed earlier, the Court in Ferber had abundant evidence
to substantiate the exploitative and abusive harms to children that
resulted from the circumstances of production of “traditional” child
255
pornography, such as the two films there at issue. But teen sexting
and autopornography today are produced under radically different
256
It is the difference between, on one hand, vicious
circumstances.
exploitation and sexual abuse that virtually (or even literally)
amounts to servitude versus, on the other hand, young people doing
what they themselves are moved to do, acting on their own initiatives
and expressing themselves as they wish in the ways they deem
important. Given this wide difference in the circumstances of
production, it would be extremely coincidental if the harms from teen
sexting and other autopornography, whatever they may be, happened
to resemble in kind or degree the harms that animated Ferber and
257
Osborne.
It is, in other words, a new and undecided question
whether the unprotected category initially declared by Ferber can be
simply allowed to subsume, without further ado, genres of material

tailoring” does not mean the law must adopt the least restrictive alternative, Ward, 491
U.S. at 799–800, but presumably a complete ban on certain content (which leaves no
“alternative channels for communication”) could be considered narrowly tailored, “only if
each activity within the proscription’s scope is an appropriately targeted evil.” Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988). That is, the law “may not regulate expression in such a
manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its
goals.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799–800. If, therefore, the goal of a given law is to prevent the
kinds of harms relied on in Ferber and Osborne, the application of that law to large
quantities of self-produced materials, which do not involve those harms, would seem to go
too far—reaching activities not demonstrated to be “appropriately targeted” evils.
255. See supra note 184.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 174–94.
257. Id. Professor Leary cites a number of sources asserting that harms can flow from
extant child pornography quite apart from the production processes because, for example,
offenders can use pornography to “fuel” their assaults and seduce children and also
because the presence of the pornography in mass circulation can lead to an evolution in
social attitudes and values in unwholesome directions. Leary, supra note 17, at 9–17.
There are, however, at least three problems with these kinds of evidence of harms: First,
the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected them as bases for suppressing expression, citing
standard First Amendment grounds. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. Second,
the objective of preventing an evolution in social attitudes and values sounds like, at
bottom, an effort to use censorship “to control men’s minds,” which is not among the
legitimate objectives for restricting free speech and press. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 565 (1969). Accord Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002). Third, a
court applying strict scrutiny needs to take care not to simply accept the products and
publications of advocacy groups as though they are valid social science data. Nor can it
necessarily draw reliably balanced conclusions about social effects from the reports of
psychology and medical practitioners who deal primarily with patients beset by clinical
conditions.
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that were not even contemplated by the legislature or the Court in the
case.
Perhaps, to be sure, the Court might someday be presented with
a body of research and studies, such as those relied on in Ferber, that
will substantiate that harms can flow from non-exploitative selfproduction of non-obscene sexual materials. Although such research
258
and studies may be long in coming, to conjecture about such harms
in the meantime, without supporting studies or research, would not be
strict scrutiny.
In summary, in prosecutions of teens for sexting and other
autopornography, the crucial opening question is whether these forms
of expression fall within the scope of the categorical exclusion that
Ferber and Osborne defined for “child pornography.” On one hand,
teen sexting and autopornography fall easily within the verbal
formulation of the categorical exclusion: they “visually depict sexual
259
conduct by children below a specified age.”
On the other hand,
nothing in either Ferber or Osborne even hints that the Court actually
ever meant to withhold the Constitution’s protection from teenagers
who make non-obscene pictures and videos of themselves and their
own legal activities. Nor can it be said that the Court meant to put
the teens who produce them on the defensive, deprived of the
presumption of unconstitutionality and of strict scrutiny review and
forced to risk life-shattering penalties as the price for pressing their
260
constitutional claims. It is still, therefore, an unaddressed question
whether teenage autopornography can be suitably lumped together
with “traditional” kinds of child-pornography materials.

III. Four Possibilities
At the moment, the constitutional status of teen sexting and
other autopornography remains uncertain. Whether the Court will
261
apply standards of strict scrutiny to decide what is “suitably” within

258. As noted earlier, supra note 16, under current laws, independent researchers have
no ability to correlate or connect particular kinds of teen autopornography content with
possible harmful results and, therefore, no credible research can be done on the subject of
whether and to what degree the production of teen sexting and autopornography might
result in harmful consequences.
259. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.747, 764 (1982) (emphasis in original).
260. As described earlier, it is at least an open question whether the government can
constitutionally place the speakers of protected speech on the defensive by this sort of
massively threatening direct burden aimed at speech itself. See supra note 93.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 128–31.
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the scope of the categorical exclusion cannot be said with confidence.
Based on what the Court has already said, however, four major
possibilities can be identified. They are:
1. The categorical exclusion created in Ferber, now that it has been
established, will be viewed as having a life of its own, no longer
limited by the concerns that led to its creation. It will continue to
exist as defined in Ferber, applying to all materials, including teen
sexting and other autopornography, that “visually depict sexual
262
conduct by children below a specified age.” Based on the acts of
sexting and autopornography that have already occurred, millions
of teens will remain subject, in principal at least, to prosecution
and lifetime disability as felony sex offenders.
2. The categorical exclusion created in Ferber will be applied to
sexting and other teen autopornography but such application will
be based on new research and studies (yet to appear) showing
that these activities by teens generate serious harms comparable
in magnitude to the child exploitation and sexual abuse relied on
in Ferber. Again, due to the acts of sexting and autopornography
that have already occurred, millions of teens will remain subject,
in principal at least, to prosecution and lifetime disability as
felony sex offenders.
3. Sexting and other teen autopornography will be subsumed into
the categorical exclusion established in Ferber, which will prima
facie apply, subject, however, to “as applied” exceptions
determined case by case as provided for in Ferber. Teens who
have engaged in sexting and autopornography will remain subject
to prosecution but will have the possibility of asserting “as
applied” challenges in defense. Nonetheless, given the monetary
and other costs of defending and the life-shattering consequences
of not succeeding, most who are prosecuted will enter pleas to
lesser charges, with varying negative impacts on their lives.
4. The scope of the categorical exclusion established in Ferber will
be clarified and adjusted so that it does not impinge on teenagers’
interests in free self-expression, on one of the following bases:
a. The categorical exclusion will be deemed closed, limited to
the exploitative genres of child pornography that were
actually before the Court in Ferber and Osborne.
b. The categorical exclusion will be deemed in principal to
encompass all genres of child pornography that cause harms

262. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (emphasis in original).
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of the magnitude of those relied on in Ferber but the Court
will, based on strict scrutiny, declare non-obscene teen
autopornography to be a protected category (based, for
example, on teenagers’ strong interest in being able to express
themselves freely).
c. The categorical exclusion will be deemed to include only those
depictions of underage sexuality whose production has a
relationship to crime sufficient to satisfy the standards of
imminence and likelihood laid out in Brandenburg. The
recording and documentation by teens of their own legal
activities will be treated as constitutionally protected
expression.

VI. Conclusion
“Sexting” and other teen autopornography are becoming
widespread phenomena that are beginning to result in criminal
prosecutions. Given the reality of changing social practices, mores
and technology utilization, today’s pornography laws are a trap for
unwary teens and operate, in effect, to criminalize a large fraction of
America’s young people. As such, these laws and prosecutions under
them represent a stark example of the contradictions that can occur
when governmental policies and initiatives built on past truths and
values collide with new and unanticipated social phenomena.
While some teen sexting and other autopornography may be
technically “obscene,” the focus of anti-pornography enforcement in
recent years has been the child pornography laws. The landmark
cases of New York v. Ferber and Osborne v. Ohio have established
and defined a categorical exclusion that denies First Amendment
protection to child pornography materials. Even though Ferber and
Osborne may not strictly speaking require a conclusion that sexting
and other autopornography are unprotected speech, at least some
lower courts and prosecutors appear to regard them that way.
By contrast, the language and reasoning of the more recent case
of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition gives strong reason to believe
that the scope of the categorical exclusion for child pornography
should be closely aligned with the governmental objectives that
Ferber and Osborne relied on. Such a limitation would allow
constitutional protection for teen sexting and autopornography that
occur on the teens’ own initiative. Ashcroft strongly implies that the
categorical exclusion should be limited to materials that are produced
by means of criminal child abuse and exploitation. Also, current
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standards of strict scrutiny for content-based regulations, if applied,
would probably prevent (on the present state of the studies and
research) self-produced teen materials from being subsumed into the
Ferber categorical exclusion. How this issue will be decided,
however, remains to be seen.
In the end, it cannot be ignored that there are also generational
factors at work in the prosecutions of teens for sexting and
autopornography. The prosecutorial and judicial personnel who are
acting in these prosecutions are typically two or more generations
removed from the teenagers whose sexual expression is condemned
and whose prospects are drastically affected. Ultimately, however,
efforts such as these are generally futile. The future and its values
belong to those whose lives lie mostly ahead of them.
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